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Natural  H i s t o r i e s  of Revolution 
' .  
For a l l s i t s  o r i g i n  i n  man's apprec ia t ion  o f . t h e  calm, continuous movement 
of t h e  c e l e s t i a l  spheres,  t h e  word Revolution evokes a  sense of break,  of 
rupture ,  of d i scon t inu i ty .  I f  it were only an evocat ion ,  t h a t  would mat ter  
only a  l i t t l e .  But t h e  idea  of revolu t ion  a s  a  se l f -conta ined  process sepa ra te  
from ordinary  s o c i a l  l i f e  has  gained wide currency among s e r i o u s  a n a l y s t s  of 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t .  One major vers ion  of t h i s  view t akes  t h e  c l a s s i c  form of 
n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y .  
The i n t u i t i v e  charm of t h e  not ion  of r evo lu t ion  a s  a  spec ies  of event 
fol lowing a  coherent ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  l i f e  h i s t o r y  has  encouraged w r i t e r  a f t e r  
w r i t e r  t o  p lay  Audubon t o  revolu t ion ,  f i r s t  o u t l i n i n g  t h e  l i f e  cycle  and then 
o f f e r i n g  a  number of c o l o r f u l  i l l u s t r a t i o n s .  Few have thought t o  c r i t i c i z e  the  
n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i c a l  analogy i t s e l f ,  and no one has  assembled t h e  s o r t  of 
, , 
sys temat ic  evidence i t  would a c t u a l l y  t ake  t o  t e s t  t hose  few. por t ions  of t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i e s  of revolut ion.which w i l l  surv ive  l o g i c a l  sc ru t iny .  
Sometimes t h e  sense of revolu t ion  a s  a  depa r tu re  from normali ty appears 
, .. 
f r ank ly  i n  t h e  language of pathology. Crane Br in ton ' s  urbane Anatomy of 
. . 
Revolution, f o r  example, l i k e n s  the  development of r evo lu t ion  t o  t h a t  of a  
I 
fever  : . . 
. . .  
In,  t h e  s o c i e t y  during the ,gene ra t ion  or  s o  be fo re  t h e  outbreak 
, of r evo lu t ion ,  i n  the.  o ld  regime, t h e r e  w i l l  b e ,  found s igns  of:, 
t h e  coming d is turbances  . . . Then comes t h e  time when.the f u l l  
symptoms d i s c l o s e  themselves, and when we can say t h e  f eve r  of 
, r evo lu t ion  has begun. This  works up . . .  . t o  a  c r i s i s ,  
f r equen t ly  accompanied by del ir ium, t h e  r u l e  of t h e  most , 
v i o l e n t  r e v o l u t i o n i s t s ,  t h e  Reign of Te r ro r .  A f t e r  t h e  c r i s i s  
comes a  pe r iod  of convalescence, u s u a l l y  marked by a  r e l a p s e  
o r  two. F i n a l l y ,  t h e  f eve r  is  ove r ,  and t h e  p a t i e n t  i s  himself 
a g a i n  . . . (1952, pp. 17-18) 
We do n o t  propose t o  j o i n  t h e  o ld  game of Improving Br in ton .  (Simple r u l e s ,  
f o r  t hose  a s  y e t  u n i n i t i a t e d :  Inning One: Scold Br in ton  f o r  h i s  p re jud ices ;  
show no q u a r t e r .  Inn ing  Two: Promulgate a  r ev i sed  v e r s i o n  of B r i t o n ' s  s t a g e s  
of r evo lu t ion .  Inn ing  Three: Congratulate  yourse l f  on your achievement.) Nor 
do we in t end  t o  a rgue  w i t h  ~ r i n t o n ' s  h i s t o r i c a l  judgments about t h e  s p e c i f i c  
r e v o l u t i o n s  he took up, a l though we d i s a g r e e  wi th  a  number of them. We hope 
i n s t e a d  (1) t o  i d e n t i f y  some of t h e  g e n e r a l  reasons  why n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  
models of r e v o l u t i o n  have worked badly and a r e  no t  l i k e l y  t o  work we l l  (2) t o  
block out  an a l t e r n a t i v e  model of r e v o l u t i o n  emphasizing i t s  c o n t i n u i t i e s  
w i th  r o u t i n e  con ten t ion  f o r  power and (3) t o  check some of t h e  imp l i ca t ions  
of t h a t  model a g a i n s t  a  s e r i e s  of even t s  f o r  which an unusual  s t o r e  of 
information i s  a v a i l a b l e :  t h e  French Revolution of 1830. 
The tu rmoi l s  of t h e  1960s i n  Europe and America have s t imu la t ed  a 
g r e a t  d e a l  of new work, some of i t  e x c e l l e n t ,  on r e v o l u t i o n ,  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  and r e l a t e d  processes .  Among o t h e r s ,  Bienen (1968) and 
Gurr (1970) have r e c e n t l y  provided wide-ranging reviews of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  We 
have ou r se lves  t u rned  our  hands t o  c r i t i c i s m  and s y n t h e s i s  elsewhere (e .g .  
T i l l y  and Rule 1965, T i l l y  1964, 1970b). A s  a  consequence, t h e r e  i s  no need 
t o  review t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  a s  a  whole here .  
Two o r  t h r e e  comments w i l l  s u f f i c e .  F i r s t ,  a lmost  a l l  r ecen t  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  work on p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  i nc lud ing  r e v o l u t i o n ,  has  cons i s t ed  
of comparisons of numerous c o u n t r i e s  a t  approximately t h e  same po in t  i n  time 
r a t h e r  than of t h e  ana lyses  of change over t ime which would be appropr i a t e  
f o r  t h e  d i r e c t  t e s t i n g  of n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  hypotheses (e.g.  Feierabend and 
Feierabend 1966, Gurr 1968 and 1970, Rummel 1966; among t h e  r a r e  except ions  
a r e  Kirkham, Levy and Cro t ty  1970, R u s s e l l  Ekman 1970).  Second, s o c i a l  
h i s t o r i a n s  have r e c e n t l y  been doing r i c h ,  sys t ema t i c  work on t h e  forms and 
personnel  of r evo lu t ion  i n  Europe and America (e.g.  Cobb.,1961-63, C.S.L. 
Davies 1969,. Hof s t ad te r  1970, ~ u d g  1970, W i l l i a m s  1968);  t h a t  work, which 
o f t e n  does t r e a t  change over t ime, i s  more d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  v e r i f i -  , 
c a t i o n  of n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  models, bu t  has  no t  s o  f a r  been employed i n  t h a t  
way. Thi rd ,  r e c e n t  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i f i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  have, t e n d e d ' t o  lump . . 
, 
revolut ion 's  t oge the r  w i th  o the r  forms of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t - u n d e r  headings . 
l i k e  " i n t e r n a l  war," " i n s t a b i l i t y , "  " c i v i l  violence; '  "aggressive behavior" o r  
s imply,  "violence."  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  proposa l  of d i s t i n c t  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i e s  
f o r  r e v o l u t i o n  i t s e l f  h a s  become r a r e r  than  i t  used t o  be. 
Natura l  h i s t o r y  t h e o r i s t s  d i f f e r  from o t h e r  s t u d e n t s  of t h e  s u b j e c t  i n  
t h a t  . they  depic . t  r e v o l u t i o n  as the  cu lmina t ion  of a  s e r i e s  o f :  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  
d i s t i n c t  developmental s t a g e s .  The s t a g e s  form a s tandard  sequence; one s t a g e  
cannot mani fes t  i t s e l f  u n t i l  t h e  preceding one is  complete. I n  some c a s e s  
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  change r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  end of t h e  cyc l e ,  t h e  f i n a l  s t a g e  of 
r evo lu t iona ry  development. Elsewhere, t h e r e  a r e  s t a g e s  subsequent t o  t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  through which t h e  s o c i e t y  moves from chaos back to; .normali ty .  I n  
gene ra l ,  t h e  appearance of t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e s  i s . a  warning o r  a promise, b u t  no t  
a  c e r t a i n . s i g n  t h a t  t h e  process  w i l l  run  i t s  f u l l . c o u r s e .  What.mark t h i s  
v a r i e t y . o f  t h e o r i z i n g  . . .  a s  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  a r e  t h e  a s s e r t i o n s  a )  . t h a t . t h e  " l a t e "  
developmental s t a g e s  do n o t  appear  un le s s  t h e  "ear ly" ones have a l r e a d y  
occurred and b) t h a t  some s o r t  of inner  l o g i c  propels  t h e  p roces s ,  so  t h a t  i n  
t he  absence of major o b s t a c l e s  i t  w i l l  work ou t  a  s tandard  sequence. Revo- 
l u t i o n s ,  l i k e  b u t t e r f l i e s ,  have n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i e s .  
The number and content  of t h e  s t a g e s  v a r i e s  widely from one n a t u r a l  
h i s t o r i c a l  scheme t o  ano the r .  I n  B r i n t o n l s  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e s  a r e  
cha rac t e r i zed  by widespread governmental i n e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t i m e s  of r e l a t i v e  
p r o s p e r i t y ,  followed by t h e  d e s e r t i o n  of t h e  government by t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  
Next comes an  inc reas ing  popular r evo lu t iona ry  excitement l ead ing  t o  t h e  
overthrow of t h e  o l d  regime, followed by a  per iod  of r u l e  by moderate revo- 
l u t i o n a r y  elements .  F i n a l l y  comes t h e  " r u l e  of t e r r o r  and v io l ence , "  fol lowed 
by a  r e t u r n  t o  something l i k e  t h e  s t a t u s  guo a n t e .  
Rex Hopper (1950),  ano the r  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  t h e o r i s t ,  s e e s  fou r  s t a g e s :  
- - Pre l iminary  Stage of Mass Excitement and Unrest 
- - Popular S tage  of Crowd Excitement and Unrest 
- - Formal S tage  of Formulation of I s s u e s  and t h e  Formation of 
Pub l i c s  
- - I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Stage of Lega l i za t ion  and S o c i e t a l  Organiza t ion .  
Far more than ~ r i n t o n ' s ,  ~ o p p e r ' s  s t a g e s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  s t a t e s  of mind of t h e  
r evo lu t iona ry  and pro to- revolu t ionary  popula t ion ,  and thus  sum up a  s o c i a l  
psychology of r evo lu t ion .  
These s t a g e  schemes have many v a r i a n t s ,  most of them i n t e r e s t i n g  . . . 
and a l l  of them inconclus ive .  We could review Sorokin ' s  two s t a g e s ,  Meadows1 
t h r e e  o r  ~ d w a r d s '  f i v e  and ga in  i n s i g h t  from each one. But how would we 
choose among t h e  bewi lder ing  a r r a y ?  Presumably by examining t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  
cons is tency ,  t h e i r  openness t o  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o r  f a l s i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e i r  va lue  i n  
reducing complex phenomena t o  t h e i r  e s s e n t i a l s ,  t h e i r  f r u i t f u l n e s s  as guides  
t o  empi r i ca l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  and t h e  f i t  between t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h a t  i n v e s t i -  
g a t i o n  and t h e  p ropos i t i ons  de r ivab le  from t h e  scheme. 
On t h e s e  grounds ( a s  opposed t o  t h e  moral ,  a e s t h e t i c  o r  h e u r i s t i c  
grounds one might a l s o  invoke f o r  t h e  judgment of such schemes), t h e  n a t u r a l  
h i s t o r i c a l  ana lyses  of r evo lu t ion  s t and  up poorly.  Thei r  l o g i c  i s  p e c u l i a r ,  
t h e i r  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  proof s l i g h t ,  t ' h e i r  r educ t ion -  of complexity undoubted 
b u t  mi sd i r ec t ed ,  t h e i r  f r u i t f u l n e s s  f o r  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  s t r i k i n g l y  
l i m i t e d  and t h e i r  f i t  wi th  o the r  f a c t s  than  those  from which they  here 
o r i g i n a l l y  i n f e r r e d  q u i t e  bad. Most of t h e s e  shortcomings s p r i n g  from t h e  
very  modus operandi  of n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y ,  and a r e  t h e r e f o r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  d i s -  
appear.  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  p r a c t i c e  of working backward from outcome t o  
an tecedent  cond i t i ons  provides  l i t t l e  means (and no i n c e n t i v e )  t o  determine 
how f r equen t ly ,  and under what c ircumstances,  t hose  same antecedent  cond i t i ons  
e x i s t  without  t h e  development of r evo lu t ion .  That having reasoned : backward 
we should p re sen t  our  conclus ions  forward,  and i n  a .  dramaturgic  .f r k e w o r k ,  
only aggrava tes  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y .  
Let  u s  c o n c r e t i z e  our complaints  by s c r u t i n i z i n g  t h r e e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
r e c e n t  s ta tements ,  t h e  f i r s t  by James Davies,  t h e  second by Ne i l  Smelser,  t h e  
t h i r d  by Chalmers Johnson. The f i r s t  is  marginal  t o  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y ,  t he '  
second con ta ins  a  very  s p e c i a l  v e r s i o n  of n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  i n  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
a  wide range of phenomena which happen t o  i nc lude  r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e  t h i r d  
belongs square ly  i n  t h e  g r e a t  t r a d i t i o n  of n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i e s  of r evo lu t ion .  
Davies on t h e  J-Curve 
Davies (1962) does n o t  p re sen t  a  scheme of "s tages" a s  such; he does 
a rgue  t h a t  a  s e t  of q u a l i t a t i v e  developmental changes l e a d  t o  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
outbreaks  and t h a t  t h e  f u l l  man i f e s t a t ion  of a l l  t h e s e  changes i s  neces sa ry  
before  a  r e v o l u t i o n  can t ake  place.  The c rux  i s  t h a t  r evo lu t ions  "are  most 
l i k e l y  t o  occur  when a  prolonged period of economic o r  s o c i a l  development i s  
followed by a  s h o r t  per iod  of sha rp  r e v e r s a l "  (1962, p. 4 ) .  "Economic o r  
s o c i a l  development," i n  t u r n ,  i s  "opportuni ty t o  s a t i s f y  b a s i c  needs,  which 
may range from merely phys i ca l  . . . t o  s o c i a l  . . ." (1962, p. 8) .  Davies 
cons ide r s  t h r e e  s u c c e s s f u l  r e v o l u t i o n s  -- Dor r ' s  Rebel l ion i n  e a r l y  n i n e t e e n t h  
century  Rhode I s l a n d ,  t h e  Russian r evo lu t ion  of 1917, and t h e  Egyptian 
r e v o l u t i o n  of 1952 -- and f i n d s  evidence of such a  p a t t e r n  i n  each case .  He 
r e f e r s  t o  t h e  p a t t e r n  a s  t h e  "J-curve" of need - sa t i s f ac t ion ,  w i th  t h e  pro- 
g r e s s i v e  per iod  of i nc reas ing  s a t i s f a c t i o n  r ep re sen t ing  t h e  s h a f t  of t h e  J and 
t h e  sha rp  downturn i t s  crook.  
Davies '  scheme r e q u i r e s  some s o r t  of weight ing and summing of t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  of "human needs" i n  a  populat ion.  Unless t h a t  assessment of needs 
i s  both reasonably a c c u r a t e  and l o g i c a l l y  independent of t h e  behavior  i t  i s  
supposed t o  exp la in ,  t h e  scheme w i l l  provide no means of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  s i t u a -  
t i o n s  w i t h  a  high l i k e l i h o o d  o f ' r e v o l u t i o n  from o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n s .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  
Davies r eads  back from t h e  f a c t  of r evo lu t ion  t o  t h e  presumably f r u s t r a t e d  
needs,  and s h i f t s  t h e  weights  ass igned  t o  v a r i o u s  needs along t h e  way. The 
d i scuss ion  of ~ o r r ' s  r e b e l l i o n ,  f o r  example, d e r i v e s  t h e  long upward s l o p e  of 
t h e  J-curve i n  terms of t h e  inc reas ing  p r o s p e r i t y  of t h e  t e x t i l e  i n d u s t r y ,  on 
which a  l a r g e  segment of t h e  popula t ion  depended. But t h e  f i n a l  "sharp r e v e r s a l "  
p r e c i p i t a t i n g  t h e  v i o l e n t  outbreak t u r n s  ouC t o , b e , t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  of demands 
f o r  popular s u f f r a g e  i n  t h e  s t a t e ;  Davies employs s i m i l a r  mixtures  of needs 
. . 
i n  t h e  development of J-curves f o r  o t h e r  r evo lu t ions .  The mixing and s h i f t i n g  
of needs makes i t  e a s i e r  t o  fash ion  a  p l a u s i b l e  f i t  of t h e  theory  t o  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  r evo lu t ion .  But makes i t  correspondingly more d i f f i c u l t  t o  draw any 
r e l i a b l e ' i n f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  c a s e s  of r e v o l u t i o n  ( o r ,  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  of non- 
r evo lu t ion )  n o t  - y e t  i n spec t ed .  
The p o i n t  is no quibble .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y  i t - i s . c r u c i a 1  t o  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  
of Davies '  argument. Davies appears  t o  s t a r t  w i th  t h e  accomplished f a c t  of 
r evo lu t ion ,  then c a s t  about  i n  t he  per iod  immediately preceding i t  f o r  evidence 
of t h e  sharp  r e v e r s a l  of some need wi th in  some p a r t  of t h e  popula t ion ,  then look 
f a r t h e r  back f o r  needs which have undergone i n c r e a s i n g  s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  some 
l e n g t h  of time. Given. t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  groups . i n  any popula t ion  experience t h e .  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  and f r u s t r a t i o n  of va r ious  needs a t  v a r i o u s  t imes,  such a  search  ' 
has  a  h igh  p r o b a b i l i t y  of success .  It a l s o  h a s  a  h igh  p r o b a b i l i t y  of i d e n t i f y i n g  
a s  c r u c i a l  f o r  r e v o l u t i o n  circumstances which a r e  i n  f a c t  commonplace o u t s i d e  
of r e v o l u t i o n s  -- a s  w i th  t h e  famed methodologist  who achieved a  hangover wi th  
bourbon and wa te r ,  s co t ch  and water ,  no t  t o  mention r y e  and water ,  and there-  
f o r e  stopped d r ink ing  t h e  offending substance:  water .  
So what of f r u s t r a t i o n s  which do n o t  r e s u l t  i n  r evo lu t ion?  F r u s t r a t i o n  
i s  a s  endemic i n  s o c i a l  l i f e  a s  need - sa t i s f ac t ions  are var ious .  Need.s, a s  
Davies himself p o i n t s  o u t ,  a r e  always e l a s t i c ,  expanding t o  encompass,more than 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  en joys  a t  p re sen t ;  t h i s  d i s p a r i t y  presumably always e n t a i l s .  i t s  
degree of f r u s t r a t i o n .  For Davies, t h e  c r u c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  is  between what 
one might t h i n k  of a s  r o u t i n e  f r u s t r a t i o n  and a "sudden, sharp  r e v e r s a l "  of 
need s a t i s f a c t i o n .  How one could a c t u a l l y  hope t o  measure t h e  degree of 
d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e s e  two states a t  any one p o i n t  i n  t ime,  l e t  a lone over 
a  s e r i e s  of p o i n t s  f o r ,  s ay ,  t h e  e n t i r e  popula t ion  of a  count ry ,  i s  no t  c l e a r .  
Davies sugges ts  a  p u b l i c  opinion p o l l ,  bu t  n e g l e c t s  t o  mention what kind of 
p o l l  would do t h e  job.  Is t h e r e  any way t o  determine t h a t  t h e  "gap between 
what people want and what they ge t "  ( t o  use  Davies '  words) i s  " in to l e rab le"  
o t h e r  than  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they  r e f u s e  t o  t o l e r a t e  i t ?  
This  d e s u l t o r y  p i ck ing  a t  t h e  scabs of Davies '  scheme f i n a l l y  uncovers 
the  r e a l  wound underneath.  The a c t o r  has  absconded! Who endures  t h e  f r u s t r a -  
t i o n s  i n  ques t ion ,  makes r evo lu t ions ,  and what connect ion do t h e  two 
a c t o r s  have w i t h  each o t h e r ?  The J-curve formula t ion  o f f e r s  u s  two equa l ly  
absurd a l t e r n a t i v e s :  
a )  r e g a r d l e s s  of who experiences t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  of c r u c i a l  
needs,  t h e  "soc ie ty"  a s  a  whole responds t o  them, and beyond 
some th re sho ld  t h e  response takes  t h e  form of r e v o l u t i o n ;  
b) t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p ropens i ty  t o  foment o r  j o i n  revolu t ion-  
a r y  a c t i o n  i s  d i r e c t l y  p ropor t iona l  t o  h i s  degree of f r u s t r a -  
t i o n ,  hence r e v o l u t i o n s  occur when more than some c r i t i c a l  
number of i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  performing r evo lu t iona ry  a c t i o n s  
and hence r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  come from t h e  most f r u s t r a t e d  
segments of t h e  popula t ion  -- f r u s t r a t e d ,  t o  be s u r e ,  by 
t h e  s p e c i a l  up-then-down process  Davies desc r ibes .  
On t h e  s u r f a c e ,  t h e  second a l t e r n a t i v e  w i l l  appear more p l a u s i b l e  t o  t hose  who 
do n o t  f i n d  t h e  r e i f i c a t i o n  of Socie ty  a t t r a c t i v e .  Unfor tuna te ly ,  c l o s e r  
s c r u t i n y  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e  second a l t e r n a t i v e  n o t  on ly  compounds t h e  p r a c t i c a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a l r e a d y  d iscussed  by r equ i r ing  t h e  weight ing  and summing of 
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f r u s t r a t i o n s  f o r  each i n d i v i d u a l ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  each group, w i th in  t h e  populat ion 
i n  ques t ion ,  b u t  a l s o  t r e a t s  a s  automatic  p r e c i s e l y  what is  most problematic 
about t h e  development of r evo lu t ions :  t h e  t r a n q i t i o n  from uncoordinated 
i n d i v i d u a l  d i s s . a t i s f a c t i o n s  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a s s a u l t s  on t h e  ho lde r s  of power. 
Nor i s  i t  a  s imple ma t t e r  of f i l l i n g  i n  t h e  b lanks .  The f i l l i n g s  f o r  t h e s e  
p a r t i c u l a r  b lanks  w i l l  cause the  e s s e n t i a l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  J-curve hypothes is  
t o  explode through c o n t r a d i c t i o n  o r  t o  decay through q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  
Smelser on C o l l e c t i v e  Behavior 
. . 
Smelser 's  system (1963) i s  r i c h e r  and more c o n s i s t e n t  than Davies ' .  It 
3 
i s  thus  more l i k e l y  t o  su rv ive  quick c r i t i c i s m .  C o l l e c t i v e  behavior ,  of course ,  
i nc ludes  t h e  whole,range of non-normative behavior  c a r r i e d  on by groups of men; 
r e v o l u t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  subtype of a  more g e n e r a l  case .  Nevertheless ,  Smelser 
t a k e s  pa ins  t o  show t h a t  a l l  t h e  va r ious  s p e c i e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior e x h i b i t  
t h e  developmental s t a g e s  which he p o s i t s .  
The scheme s p e c i f i e s  s i x  cond i t i ons  which must b e  met,  o r  "act ivated",  
b e f o r e c a n  ep isode  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior can t a k e  p l ace  (1962, pp. 15-17). 
They a r e  (1)  structural~.conduciveness o r  "permissiveness" of t h e  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  t o  a given form of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior ;  (2)  s t r u c t u r a l  s t r a i n ;  
(3)  growth and spread  of a gene ra l i zed  b e l i e f ;  (4) p r e c i p i t a t i n g  f a c t o r s ;  
(5) mob i l i za t ion  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  f o r  a c t i o n ;  ( 6 )  t h e  ope ra t ion  of s o c i a l  
c o n t r o l .  While' a l l .  th,ese elements 'may e x i s t  f o r  varying. . l engths  of t ime 
be fo re  t h e  ep isode  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  even begins ,  they  e n t e r  t h e  process  
i t s e l f  i n  p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  o rde r .  Hence t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  scheme a s  a 
"value-added" a n a l y s i s .  
Smelser 's  is  t h e  most sys temat ic  and h e l p f u l  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  d e f i n i n g  
f e a t u r e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  we have. The n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  p o r t i o n  of t h e  
work, however, r e s t s  on p ropos i t i ons  which a r e  obvious o r  which r e p r e s e n t  
e x p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e  i n i t i a l  d e f i n i t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior .  Th i s  becomes 
apparent  when one a t t empt s  t o  de r ive  p r e d i c t i o n s  of t h e  form, l o c u s  and 
i n t e n s i t y  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  s e t t i n g s  from those  
p ropos i t i ons .  
S t r u c t u r a l  conduciveness ,  f o r  example, means simply t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  
behavior ,  l i k e  any o t h e r  behavior ,  is  circumscribed by i t s  s o c i a l  con tex t .  
The occurrence of a f i n a n c i a l  panic ,  Smelser p o i n t s  o u t ,  presupposes t h e  
ex i s t ence  of a  money economy. S t r u c t u r a l  s t r a i n ,  t h e  second de terminant ,  
seems t o  mean any s o r t  of shared  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  way t h e  world works 
(al though a t  t imes i t  s h i f t s  t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  cond i t i ons  -- e.g. r o l e - c o n f l i c t  
-- under which such shared  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s  a r i s e ) .  Since c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  
means some c o l l e c t i v e  a t tempt  t o  make t h e  world work d i f f e r e n t l y ,  Smelser has  
simply c a l l e d  ou r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  people do n o t  a c t  t oge the r  t o  
contravene e x i s t i n g  s o c i a l  p a t t e r n s  un le s s  motivated t o  do s o .  
The same s o r t  of obse rva t ions  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  t h i r d  de te rminant ,  "growth 
and spread of a  gene ra l i zed  b e l i e f " ,  which appears  t o  mean t h a t  people do no t  
a c t  concer ted ly  u n l e s s  t hey  sha re  some common pe rcep t ions  of t h e i r  s o c i a l  world. 
(Smelser 's  sugges t ion  t h a t  such gene ra l i zed  b e l i e f s  i nc lude  a  symbolic repre-  
s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  s t r a i n s  t o  which t h e  a c t o r s  a r e  responding,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand, i s  more i n t r i g u i n g ,  less obvious and more open t o  e m p i r i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n ) .  
The e f f e c t  of any p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of " p r e c i p i t a t i n g  f a c t o r s "  aga in  appea r s  
only t o  lend i t s e l f  t o  es tab l i shment  a f t e r  t h e  f a c t ,  and t h e r e f o r e  t o  have no 
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p r e d i c t i v e  va lue .  The f i f t h  determinant ,  "mobi l iza t ion  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  f o r  
a c t i o n , "  s t a t e s  t h e  t ru i sm t h a t  on ly  mobil ized men a c t  c o l l e c t i v e l y .  Like 
Davies '  l e a p  from d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  t o  r e b e l l i o n ,  i t  l e a v e s  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  
ques t ions  untouched: where, when and how does t h e  mob i l i za t ion  a , c tua l ly  occur? 
. . 
The l a s t  de te rminant ,  t h e  "opera t ion  of s o c i a l  c o n t r o l , "  does no t  run  
p a r a l l e l  t o  ' the f i r s t  f i v e .  I t- is  unc lea r  why t h e  workings of s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  
should a f f e c t  c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  on ly  a f t e r  people a r e  mobil ized f o r  a c t i o n ;  
Smelser himself seems t o  inc lude  t h e  e f f e c t s  of s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  among t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  of s t r u c t u r a l  conduciveness,  h i s  f i r s t  determinant .  I f  we drop t h e  
idea  of sequence, however, we a r e  l e f t  w i th  t h e  observa t ion  t h a t  o t h e r s  r e s i s t  
c o l l e c t i v e  behavior ,  and t h e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  
and t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  produces a  new equi l ibr ium.  The f i r s t  e n t e r s  i n t o  
t h e  p r a c t i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior ,  s i n c e  without  r e s i s t a n c e  we 
would never d e t e c t  i t s  occurrence;  t h e  second i s  merely a ' concep tua l  convenience 
n o t  open t o  proof ,  an a r t i f a c t  of t h e  o b s e r v e r ' s  ~ L l l i n g n e s s ,  t o  mark a 
beginning and an  end t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t a n c e  of c o l l e c t i v e  d e v i a t i o n  from 
expected behavior .  
I n  s h o r t ,  Smelser 's  scheme of s t a g e s  t u r n s  out  t o  be  t h e  c a r e f u l  
e x p l i c a t i o n  of a  d e f i n i t i o n  -- q u i t e  a  u s e f u l  d e f i n i t i o n ,  bu t  a  d e f i n i t i o n  
none the l e s s .  . T h i s  d i sappo in t ing  r e s u l t  comes from t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  modus 
operandi  of s o c i o l o g i c a l  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y :  s t a r t i n g  wi th  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
t h e  "species"  and working backwards t o  i d e n t i f y  i t s  necessary  an tecedents .  
The r e s u l t  i s  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of s t a g e s  i n  t h e  development of t h e  s p e c i e s  
which a r e  e i t h e r  p re sen t  by d e f i n i t i o n  o r  common i n  s i t u a t i o n s  which do not  
I 
produce t h e  spec i e s .  The a c t u a l  work of exp lana t ion  only  begins  a t  t h a t  po in t .  
Johnson on Revolut ionary Change 
Chalmers ~ o h n s o n ' s  Revolut ionary Change (1968) e x h i b i t s  most of t h e  
same d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Like Davies and Smelser,  Johnson views t h e  l i f e - c y c l e  of 
r e v o l u t i o n  a s  a  homeostat ic  process ,  i n  which t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of growing d i s -  
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e q u i l i b r a t i o n  l e a d  t o  t h e  c l i m a c t i c  events  of t h e  change of regime i t s e l f ,  t o  
be  followed by r e - e q u i l i b r a t i n g  processes  which b r ing  t h e  s o c i e t y  back t o  i t s  
accustomed balance.  Like  Smelser,  Johnson d e f i n e s  t h e  main cond i t i on  of 
normal i ty  i n  terms of va lue - in t eg ra t ion ,  and p o r t r a y s  t h e  f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  of 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  t o  r e v o l u t i o n  t h e  f a i l u r e  of synchroniza t ion  between v a l u e s  and 
r e a l i t i e s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Johnson s e e s  t h a t  f a i l u r e  a s  mani fes t ing  i t s e l f  i n  
t h e  popu la t ion ' s  withdrawal of moral a u t h o r i t y  from t h e  government. He s e e s  
t h r e e  c l u s t e r s  of causes  of r e v o l u t i o n :  
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h e  p re s su res  c r ea t ed  by a  d i s - equ i l i b ra t ed  
s o c i a l  system -- a s o c i e t y  which is changing and which i s  i n  
need of f u r t h e r  change i f  i t  i s  t o  cont inue  t o  e x i s t .  Of a l l  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  d i s e q u i l i b r a t e d  system, t h e  one 
t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e s  most d i r e c t l y  t o  a r evo lu t ion  i s  power 
d e f l a t i o n  -- t h e  f a c t  t h a t  during a per iod  of change t h e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  of a  system depends i n c r e a s i n g l y  upon t h e  
maintenance and deployment of f o r c e  by t h e  occupants of t h e  
formal a u t h o r i t y  s t a t u s e s .  
The second c l u s t e r  of necessary  causes r evo lves  around t h e  
q u a l i t y  of t h e  purposefu l  change being undertaken whi le  a 
system i s  d i s e q u i l i b r a t e d .  This  q u a l i t y  depends upon t h e  
a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  l e a d e r s .  I f  they  a r e  unable t o  
develop p o l i c i e s  which w i l l  main ta in  t h e  confidence of non- 
devian t  a c t o r s  i n  t h e  system and i t s  capac i ty  t o  move.toward 
r e synchron iza t ion ,  a l o s s  of a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  ensue. Such a  
l o s s  means t h a t  t h e  use  of f o r c e  by t h e  e l i t e  i s  no longer  
considered l e g i t i m a t e ,  a l though i t  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
mean t h a t  a  r e v o l u t i o n  w i l l  occur a t  once . . . 
The f i n a l ,  o r  s u f f i c i e n t ,  cause  of a  r evo lu t ion  i s  some 
i n g r e d i e n t ,  u s u a l l y  con t r ibu ted  by f o r t u n e ,  which dep r ives  
t h e  e l i t e  of i t s  ch ie f  weapon f o r  en fo rc ing  s o c i a l  behavior  
(e.g. an army mutiny) ,  o r  which l e a d s  a  group of  r evo lu t ion -  
a r i e s  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  they  have t h e  means t o  dep r ive  t h e  
e l i t e  of i t s  weapons of coercion.  (1968, p. 91) 
Johnson then  a t t empt s  t o  l i n k  t h e s e  ve ry  g e n e r a l  phenomena t o  i n d i v i d u a l  
behavior  through t h e  sequence: r a p i d  change - sys t ema t i c  d i sequ i l i b r ium - 
over tax ing  of e x i s t i n g  means of homeostat ic  and purposive. response t o  change 
- panic-anxiety-shame-guilt-depression e t c .  - formation of movements of p r o t e s t .  
True t o  h i s  predecessors ,  he  proposes t h e  s u i c i d e  r a t e  as prime index of 
d i sequ i l i b r ium.  
. . The resemblances t o  ~ a v i e s '  and, e s p e c i a l l y ,  Smelser ' s  arguments a r e .  
s t r i k i n g .  The drawbacks a r e  s i m i l a r .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  " f a i l e d  synchroniza- 
t i o n  between va lues  and r e a l i t i e s "  can be  i d e n t i f i e d  a t  a l l  independent ly of 
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  behavior  i t  i s  supposed t o  p r e d i c t ,  t h e  evidence t h a t  i t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  r evo lu t iona ry  c o u n t r i e s  from o t h e r s  is i n  extremely s h o r t  supply.  
That f a i l u r e  i s  t h e  gene ra l  cond i t i on  of mankind. S i m i l a r l y ,  i t  is  t r u e  by 
d e f i n i t i o n  tha t .power  d e f l a t e s  a n d . l e g i t i m a t e . 1 e a d e r s  l o s e  a u t h o r i t y  dur ing  
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r e v o l u t i o n s ,  b u t  no th ing  i n  t h e  evidence known t o  us  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  
d e f l a t i o n s  and '  l o s s  n e c e s s a r i l y  precede r e v o l u t i o n s  o r ,  conversely,  t h a t  t h e i r  
occurrence p r e d i c t s  t o  r evo lu t ion .  (One could ,  i f  w i l l i n g  t o  work w i t h i n  t h i s  
conceptua l  framework, manufacture a  p l aus ibe  case  t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  d i s a g r e e a b l e  
r e s i s t a n c e  of Par l iament ,  Charles  1's power was i n f l a t i n g  up t o  s h o r t l y  b e f o r e  
t h e  outbreak of t h e  C i v i l  War i n  1642; i t  is  even e a s i e r  t o  po in t  out  how 
r e g u l a r l y  t e r r o r  q u e l l s  d i s s e n t ) .  Only moving backward from t h e  f a c t  of 
r evo lu t ion  t o  i t s  presumed s tandard  f e a t u r e s  makes i t  so easy t o  a r r i v e  a t  such 
h e l p l e s s  p ropos i t i ons .  
Again we f a c e  t h e  Case of t h e  Absconded Actor .  The ideas  of power 
d e f l a t i o n  and l o s s  of a u t h o r i t y  t r e a t  gene ra l i zed  i n a b i l i t i e s  of a  regime t o  
make i t s  d i c t a t e s  f e l t ,  widespread oppos i t ion  t o  t h e  e x e r c i s e  of governmental 
power. That t h e  i n a b i l i t y  should be gene ra l i zed  and the  oppos i t ion  widespread 
ga in  c r e d i b i l i t y  from t h e i r  connect ion wi th  t h e  underlying assumption t h a t  "a 
whole soc i e ty"  somehow expresses  i t s e l f  i n  r evo lu t ion .  W e  would b e  i n c l i n e d  t o  
deny t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of any such a c t o r  a s  a  "Whole Society" a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  u t i l i t y  
of H i s  i nven t ion .  But even l eav ing  a s i d e  doubts  on t h a t  s co re  f o r  some o t h e r  
polemical  occas ion ,  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  assumption he lps  i n  so lv ing  t h e  
problem a t  hand. The nub of r evo lu t ion  i s  a  s e i z u r e  of power over a  govern- 
mental appa ra tus  by one group from ano the r ,  I f  we want t o  l i m i t  t h e  po r t en tous  
word " revolu t ion"  t o  those  c a s e s  i n  which t h e  groups a r e  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  and/or  
t h e  s e i z u r e  of power produces ex tens ive  changes i n  s o c i a l  l i v e ,  s o  be it. It 
remains t h a t  t h e  ba re  requirements  of such a  change a r e  t h e  involvement of only 
a  small  po r t ion  of t h e  popula t ion .  Nor does i t  seem a t  a l l  l i k e l y  t h a t  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  u n i f o r m ' s t a t e  of mind on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  remainder of t h e  popula t ion  
. , 
is  a  necessary  cond i t i on  f o r  such a  change. Yet except  f o r  t h e  important . % ,. :;
* .* 
> A 
po in t  concerning t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  and o t h e r  r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s ,  
-. , 
Johnson's  argument provides  us  wi th  no r e l i a b l e  way of a n t i c i p a t i n g  e i t h e r  
t he  n a t u r e  of t h e  con£ l i c t  o r  t h e  i d e n t i t y  of -the p a r t i c i p a n t s .  Smelser 's  
scheme, Davies ' and, indeed,  t h e  whole range of n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i c a l  t h e o r i z i n g  
l eaves  those  c e n t r a l  explana tory  ques t ions  v i r t u a l l y  untouched. , . 
I n  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  cond i t i on ,  n a t u r a l - h i s t o r y  t h e o r i e s  of r evo lu t ion  a r e  
n e a r l y  i r r e f u t a b l e  -- n o t  because they  a r e  m a n i f e s t l y  c o r r e c t ,  bu t  becavse they  
c o n s i s t  mainly of ways of r a t i o n a l i z i n g  even t s  a f t e r  t h e  f a c t .  Even Crane 
Br in ton ,  who provides  us  w i th  t h e  most conc re t e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s  of t h e  
s t a g e s  of r evo lu t ion ,  o f f e r s  them as no more than  pre l iminary  empi r i ca l  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s ,  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  few g r e a t  r e v o l u t i o n s  he t a k e s  up. Any 
e f f o r t  t o  apply  sys t ema t i c  evidence t o  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  
ana lyses  w i l l  t he re f  o r e  r e q u i r e  r e c a s t i n g  t h e  arguments i n t o  t e s t a b l e  propos- 
i t i o n s .  We s h a l l  make some e f f o r t s  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  But we s h a l l  pu t  more 
of our energy i n t o  t h e  formulat ion and p re l imina ry  t e s t i n g  of a  model embodying 
a  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  g e n e r a l  understanding of t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of r evo lu t ions  from 
t h a t  i m p l i c i t  i n  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y .  I 
For any popula t ion ,  w e  may a s k  whether t h e r e  e x i s t  one o r  more 
C 
organ iza t ions  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  concent ra ted  means of coerc ion  w i t h i n  I I -  . .; 
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  Such o rgan iza t ions  a r e  governments. We may then  enumerate - ,  
,,. 
a l l  groups w i t h i n  t h e  popula t ion  which, dur ing  some p a r t i c u l a r  span of t ime,  
c o l l e c t i v e l y  apply resources  t o  t h e  in f luence  of a  c e r t a i n  government. They 
a r e  contenders  f o r  power w i t h . r e s p e c t  t o  t h a t  government. To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
a  contender  can r o u t i n e l y  l a y  claim t o  t h e  gene ra t ion  of a c t i o n  o r  y i e l d i n g  of 
r e sou rces  by agen t s  of t h e  government, t h e  contender  i s  a member of t h e  p o l i t y ,  
which t h e r e f o r e  c o n s i s t s  of a l l  contenders  s u c c e s s f u l l y  e x e r c i s i n g  r o u t i n e  
claims t o  government response .  Some groups a r e  n o t  contenders ,  and some 
contenders  (which w e  c a l l  cha l l enge r s )  a r e  n o t  members of t h e  p o l i t y ;  t h e  
members of t h e  p o l i t y  d i f f e r  among themselves i n  t h e  amount and type  of 
response t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  of resources  t o  t h e  government produces.  
So much f o r  d e f i n i t i o n s .  We imagine t h e  g e n e r a l  ope ra t ion  of p o l i t i e s  
i n  t h e  fo l lowing  way: Every p o l i t y  e s t a b l i s h e s  t e s t s  of membership, and a l l  
p o l i t i e s  i nc lude  among such t e s t s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  mobi l ize  o r  coerce  s i g n i f i c a n t  
numbers of people.  Furthermore, w i th in  t h e  p o l i t y  members c o n t i n u a l l y  t e s t  
one ano the r ;  r epea t ed  f a i l u r e s  of p a r t i a l  t e s t s  l e a d  t o  f u l l e r  t e s t s  which 
l e a d ,  i f  f a i l e d ,  t o  exc lus ion  from t h e  p o l i t y .  Each new e n t r y  o r  e x i t  
r e d e f i n e s  t h e  c r i t e r i a  of membership i n  a d i r e c t i o n  f avorab le  t o  t h e  cha rac t e r -  
i s t i c s  of t h e  p re sen t  set of members; t h e  members tend  t o  become a t t ached  t o  
those  c r i t e r i a  a s  a ma t t e r  of p r i n c i p l e .  The l i f e  of t h e  p o l i t y  t h e r e f o r e  
c o n s i s t s  of a )  t h e  r o u t i n e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r e sou rces  t o  t h e  in f luence  of t h e  
government by members of t h e  p o l i t y ;  b )  a t t empt s  by non-members ( o r d i n a r i l y  
r e s i s t e d  by members i n  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  with agen t s  of t h e  government) t o  
i n f luence  t h e  government, inc luding  a t tempts  t o  g a i n  membership; c )  an ongoing 
s e r i e s  of c o n t e s t s ,  ranging  from par l iamentary  maneuvering t o  s t r e e t  f i g h t i n g ,  
among members of t h e  p o l i t y .  (Actual ly a )  w i l l  f r e q u e n t l y  l e a d  t o  c ) ,  a s  
when one member l a y s  c l a im  t o  resources  a l r e a d y  committed t o  ano the r ,  and b)  
w i l l  f r e q u e n t l y  co inc ide  wi th  c ) ,  s i n c e  members o f t e n  form c o a l i t i o n s  wi th  
non-members i n  order  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r e sou rces  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
t h e i r  common ends.)  
Because of t h e  t e s t i n g  process  by which contenders  a c q u i r e  o r  l o s e  
membership, c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  tends t o  i n c r e a s e  when t h e  membership of t h e  
p o l i t y  i s  changing r a p i d l y .  C o l l e c t i v e  v i o l e n c e  w i l l  p i t  members a g a i n s t  
members, and agen t s  of t h e  government ( e s p e c i a l l y  r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  l i k e  t roops  
a n d - p o l i c e )  a g a i n s t  non-members, but  r a r e l y  non-members a g a i n s t  non-members, 
a g e n t s  of t h e  government a g a i n s t  members, o r  agen t s  a g a i n s t  each o t h e r .  I n  
t h e  event  of r e v o l u t i o n ,  however, a l l  t h e s e  r e g u l a r i t i e s  change. 
Revolut ion,  i n  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  model, c o n s i s t s  of t h e  fragmentat ion of a  
s i n g l e  p o l i t y .  The c a s e  i n  which t h e  f ragmenta t ion  t u r n s  out  t o  be permanent 
g r e a t l y  resemb,les t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  -- indeed ,  t h e  two c a s e s  a r e  o f t e n  i n d i s t i n -  
gu i shab le  a t  t h e  s t a r t  -- b u t  t h e  term " revo l t "  o r  " c i v i l  war" a p p l i e s  more 
e a s i l y  i n  t h a t  case .  Leon Trotsky (1932, 222-230) s t a t e d  t h e  e s s e n t i a l s  of t h e  
f ragmenta t ion  yea r s  ago,  under t h e  heading of "dual ' sovere ignty ."  We d i f f e r  
from Trotsky  i n  t h r e e  ways: 1 )  i n  claiming t h a t  i n  many r evo lu t ions  sovere ignty  
i s  a c t u a l l y  m u l t i p l e ,  r a t h e r  than dua l ;  2) i n  cons ider ing  i t  more l i k e l y  t h a t  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t i e s  w i l l  be  composed.of ' c o a l i t i o n s  :of c l a s s e s  than  t h a t  
t hey  w i l l  be  s i n g l e  c l a s s e s ;  3) i n  recogniz ing  t h a t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n s  sometimes 
i n c l u d e  groupings which a r e  based on language,  r e l i g i o n ,  reg ion  o r  some o the r  
form of s o l i d a r i t y  than c l a s s .  
The fragmentat ion of t h e  p o l i t y  can  occur  i n  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
The most l i k e l y  is  f o r  some new c o a l i t i o n  of contenders  ( a t  t h e  extreme, a  
s i n g l e  non-member, of t h e  p o l i t y )  t o  l a y  c l a im  t o  exc lus ive  c o n t r o l  over t h e  
government whi le  t h e  remaining e s t a b l i s h e d  members of t h e  p o l i t y  cont inue  t o  
p r e s s  t h e i r  exc lus ive  c la ims ,  while  some p o r t i o n  of t h e  popula t ion  honors t h e  
c la ims  of each of t h e  fragment po l i t i - e s .  These circumstances may we l l  produce 
a  temporary f ragmenta t ion  of t h e  government ( a s  when i n s u r r e c t i o n a r y  armies 
adminis te r  p a r t  of a  count ry)  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  fragmentat ion of t h e  p o l i t y .  
I n  any case ,  a  r e v o l u t i o n  begins  when p rev ious ly  acqu ie scen t  c i t i z e n s  faced  
wi th  s t r i c t l y  incompatible  demands from t h e  government and an  a l t e r n a t i v e  
a u t h o r i t y  obey t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y .  It cont inues  u n t i l  on ly  one c e n t r a l  
a u t h o r i t y  remains.  
So f a r  we have merely s e t  up a  conceptual  scheme, embedded i n  a s t r o n g l y  
p o l i t i c a l  view of c o n f l i c t ,  which con ta ins  a  few p ropos i t i ons  s o  gene ra l  a s  
no t  t o  be amenable t o  v e r i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h e i r  p re sen t  form. The scheme, neverthe-  
l e s s ,  narrows t h e  search  f o r  t h e  causes of r evo lu t ion  from t h e  d e t e c t i o n  of 
anomie, s t r a i n ,  dysfunct ion  o r  f r u s t r a t i o n  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  
cond i t i ons  producing t h e  fo l lowing  outcomes: 
a )  appearance of contenders  (or c o a l i t i o n s  of contenders )  advancing 
exc lus ive  a l t e r n a t i v e  claims t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  over t h e  government 
c u r r e n t l y  exe r t ed  by members of t h e  p o l i t y ;  
b) acceptance of t h o s e  claims by a  s i g n i f i c a n t  segment of 
t h e  populat ion;  
c )  formation of c o a l i t i o n s  between members of t h e  p o l i t y  and t h e  ' 
contenders  advancing t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c la ims;  
d)  unwi l l ingness  o r  i n c a p a c i t y  of t h e  government t o  suppress  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  and/or t h e  acceptance of i t s  c la ims  
( h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e  u n r e l i a b i l i t y  of armed f o r c e s  has  been 
c r u c i a l  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ) .  
I f  t h e s e  a r e  indeed t h e  c o n s t i t u e n t  elements of a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  
they have some i n t e r e s t i n g  imp l i ca t ions  f o r  t h e  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  of r e v o l u t i o n .  
They g i v e  us  no p a r t i c u l a r  reason  f o r  expec t ing  a gradual  crescendo of c o n f l i c t  
up t o  t h e  po in t  of r e v o l u t i o n ,  followed by a r a p i d  readjus tment ,  which i s  t h e  
sequence a . t ens ion- re lease .  model impl ies .  
On t h e  c o n t r a r y .  A more reasonable  sequence would run:  / 
1 )  t he , , g radua l  mob i l i za t ion  of contenders  unacceptable  t o  t h e  
members of t h e  p o l i t y  and/or  making exc lus ive  claims t o  
governmental c o n t r o l ;  
2) a r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number of people accept ing  t h o s e  
c la ims  and/or  a r a p i d  expansion of t h e  c o a l i t i o n  inc lud ing  t h e  
unacceptable  o r  exc lus ive  contenders ;  
3 )  an unsuccessfu l  e f f o r t  by t h e  government, a c t i n g  on behal f  of 
t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y ,  t o  suppress  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  
and/or t h e  acceptance  of i t s  c la ims;  
4)  es tab l i shment  by t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  of e f f e c t i v e  
I 
c o n t r o l  over  some p o r t i o n  of t h e  government; 
5) st l ruggle of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  t o  main ta in  o r  extend 
t h a t  c o n t r o l ;  
6) r ecdns t ruc r ion  of a s i n g l e  p o l i t y  through t h e  v i c t o r y  of t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n ,  through i ts  d e f e a t ,  o r  through t h e  
es tab l i shment  of a modus v ivend i  between t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  
and some o r  a l l  of t h e  o l d  members. 
It i s  a ma t t e r  of pure convenience whether we say  dua l  sovere ignty  -- and 
t h e r e f o r e  r e v o l u t i o n  -- commences a t  s t a g e  2, s t a g e  3,  o r  s t a g e  4. It ends,  
obviously,  a t  s t a g e  6. 
Some In fe rences  from t h e  Model 
This  " n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y 1 '  of r evo lu t ion ,  l i k e  those  reviewed e a r l i e r ,  
con ta ins  l i t t l e  more than t h e  e x p l i c a t i o n  of a  d e f i n i t i o n .  It l e a d s ,  however, 
t o  some i n t r i g u i n g  obse rva t ions  on t h e  sequence of v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s  i n  
r evo lu t ions .  F i r s t ,  t h e  l e v e l  of c o n f l i c t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be  much h ighe r  a f t e r  
t he  f i r s t  major a c t i o n s  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  than  be fo re ,  because t h e  emergence 
of dua l  sovere ignty  cha l l enges  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of every member of t h e  p o l i t y ,  and 
thus  begins a  major round of t e s t i n g .  
Second, t h e  s t r u g g l e  between t h e  two p o l i t i e s  is i t s e l f  l i k e l y  t o  
produce a  po la r i zed  form of c o n f l i c t ,  a c t i v a t i n g  an  excep t iona l  p ropor t ion  
of t h e  popula t ion  on one s i d e  o r  another .  
Thi rd ,  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  -- whichever combination 
of t h e  o r i g i n a l  contenders  i t  con ta ins  -- i s  l i k e l y  t o  f a c e  cons ide rab le  
r e s i s t a n c e  a s  i t  a t t empt s  t o  r e e s t a b l i s h  r o u t i n e  governmental c o n t r o l  over  t h e  
popula t ion  a s  a  whole a f t e r  s e i z i n g  t h e  governmental appara tus .  To t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  a c t i o n  begins  w i th  t h e  s e i z u r e  of a  c r u c i a l  b u t  
narrow geographica l  and/or  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p a r t  of t h e  appa ra tus ,  t h e  s t r u g g l e  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  s h i f t  away from t h a t  l ocus  a f t e r  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  c o n s o l i d a t e  
t h e i r  c o n t r o l  t h e r e .  I n  geograph ica l ly  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  
s t a t e s  l i k e  those  of t h e  modern West, r evo lu t iona ry  c o n f l i c t s  a r e  most l i k e l y  
t o  o r i g i n a t e  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  and then  s h i f t  t o  t h e  per iphery  i f  t h e  c e n t e r  i s  
won. 
Fourth,  t h e  i n i t i a l  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t  ion  i s  l i k e l y  t o  fragment , 
l e av ing  a  few contenders  excep t iona l ly  powerful,  f o r  s e v e r a l  reasons:  a )  t h e  
i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l  r e q u i r e s  a  l a r g e r  c o a l i t i o n  than does t h e  maintenance 
of c o n t r o l ;  b) t h e  divergence of t h e  longer-run o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  coalesced 
contenders  i s ' l i k e l y  t o  become more s a l i e n t  and s e r i o u s  a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  
e f f o r t  of d i s lodg ing  t h e  previous  p o l i t y  from c o n t r o l  is  p a s t ;  c )  t hose  
contenders  which have mobil ized r a p i d l y  i n  response t o  short-run c r i s e s  bu t  
which remain r e l a t i v e l y  underorganized a r e  a l s o  l i k e l y  t o  demobi l ize  more 
r a p i d l y  than  o t h e r  contenders ,  and thus  t o  l o s e  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  t e s t i n g  which 
immediately fo l lows  t h e  i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of power. On t h e s e  m a t t e r s ,  c o a l i t i o n  
t h e o r i s t s  (e .g . ,  Gamson 1968a) have a l r eady  suggested some promising hypotheses.  
Tes t ing  t h e  Model 
Though easy  t o  s t a t e ,  t h e s e  i d e a s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t e s t  -- f o r  they  
r e q u i r e  a  form of d a t a  much ha rde r  t o  assemble than  t h e  b a l d  r e c i t a t i o n  of 
events  which f u e l  t h e  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  arguments. Needed f o r  t h i s  " p o l i t i c a l  
process"  model of r e v o l u t i o n a r y  change a r e  d a t a  which relate t h e  mani fes t  
c o n f l i c t s  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  t o  d i f f e r e n t  segments of t h e  base  popula t ion  be fo re ,  
dur ing  and a f t e r  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  even t s ,  v i a  a n  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  changing 
a c t i o n s  and r e l a t i o n s  of t h e  p r i n c i p a l  contenders  f o r  power. These m a t e r i a l s  
must be  ga thered  i n  such a way a s  t o  view even t s  t r a n s p i r i n g  be fo re ,  dur ing  and 
a f t e r  t h e  r evo lu t ion  wi th  t h e  same a n a l y t i c a l  l e n s ,  so  a s  t o  avoid t h e  n a t u r a l  
h i s t o r y  f a l l a c y  of "working backward" from t h e  accomplished f a c t  of r evo lu t iona ry  
change i n  order  t o  i d e n t i f y  s t a g e s  which "had" t o  l e a d  t o  r evo lu t ion .  Such 
d a t a  a r e  a  thousand t imes  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  assemble than  a r e  s t r a igh t fo rward  
accounts  of t h e  p r i n c i p a l  events .  The c o l l e c t i o n  of t h e  informat ion  on which 
w e  s h a l l  draw i n  t h e  fo l lowing  a n a l y s i s  has  taken seven y e a r s  of t h e  t ime of 
good-sized r e s e a r c h  teams a t  Harvard, Toronto and Michigan. Even t h a t  
information f a i l s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  d i r e c t l y  s e v e r a l  c r u c i a l  p a r t s  of t h e  processes  
of mob i l i za t ion ,  conten t ion  and t r a n s f e r  of power t h a t  we have been d i scuss ing .  
Despi te  a  number of t r i a l s ,  we have no t  s o  f a r  been a b l e  t o  develop a  r e l i a b l e  
procedure f o r  enumerating contenders ,  measuring t h e i r  mob i l i za t ion  and 
c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  of power which 
i s  t r u l y  independent of t h e  c o n f l i c t s  w e  are a t t empt ing  t o  exp la in .  The, 
p o r t i o n s  of t h e  argument w e  a r e  i n  t h e  b e s t  p o s i t i o n  t o  t e s t  d i r e c t l y  a r e  
t h e r e f o r e  t h o s e  dea l ing  wi th  t h e  t iming and personnel  of v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s .  
The d a t a  c o n s i s t  c h i e f l y  of coded, machine-readable accounts  of every  
v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t  above a  c e r t a i n  s c a l e  occu r r ing  i n  France noted by t r a i n e d  
r e a d e r s  scanning two n a t i o n a l  d a i l y  newspapers f o r  each day over  t h e  pe r iods  
from 1830 through 1860 and 1930 through 1960, p l u s  a  random t h r e e  months per  
year  over t h e  per iod  from 1861 through 1929. Information on these  even t s  i s  
drawn n o t  on ly  from t h e  o r i g i n a l  newspaper accounts ,  b u t  a l s o  from a r c h i v a l  
sources  and secondary h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  f u r t h e r  da t a  c o n s i s t  
of machine-readable d e s c r i p t i o n s  of a  wide v a r i e t y  of s o c i a l  i n d i c a t o r s  year  
/ 
by year  f o r  t h e  86 t o  90 French departements and f o r  France as a whole. 
A "dis turbance,"  f o r  t h e s e  purposes,  i s  a  cont inuous i n t e r a c t i o n  between 
two o r  more format ions ,  o r  between one formation and t h e  p rope r ty  of ano the r ,  
i n  which a t  l e a s t  one formation has f i f t y  o r  more p a r t i c i p a n t s  and i n  t h e  
course  of which a t  l e a s t  one formation s e i z e s  o r  damages persons o r  p rope r ty .  
(Acts of war between s t a t e s ,  however, a r e  excluded.) The fo l lowing  i n c i d e n t ,  
a s  recorded by one of t h e  r e a d e r s ,  descr ibed  e v e n t s  which took p l ace  i n  t h e  
southern  French c i t y  of Carcasonne i n  March, 1832: 
The d i s tu rbance  which a f f l i c t e d  t h i s  commune on t h e  e i g h t h  
of t h i s  month broke ou t  aga in  yes te rday  (Sunday), wi th  even 
g r e a t e r  v io l ence .  The i n s i s t e n c e  of t h e  Bishop on suppor t ing  
the-,  i n t e r d i c t i o n  of Father  ~ a t a i l l g ,  t h e  p a r i s h  p r i e s t ,  and 
t h e  presence of o t h e r  p r i e s t s  s e n t  t o  Sa in t -Vincen t .pa r i sh  
t o  conduct t h e  Sunday s e r v i c e s ,  b r o u g h t . f o r t h  a  l a r g e  crowd 
i n  the- ,church ,  and t h e  p r i e s t s  were chased from t h e  premises,. 
The P r e f e c t ,  who on t h e  e i g h t h - h a d -  r e fused  t o  c a l l  i n  t h e  
~ a t i o n a l  Guard t o  d i s p e r s e  t h e  crowd, took r ecour se  t o  t h e  
Guard on t h i s  occasion,  dec l in ing  t o  cal l  i n  t h e  r e g u l a r  
anpy f q r  f e a r  of c r e a t i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  antagonism. 
Thus t h e  Nat iona l  Guard assembled a t  Canal Square. The 
Guard would have succeeded i n  calming t h e  d i s tu rbance ,  
except  f o r  t h e  presence  of t h e  P r e f e c t ,  t h e  General  and 
s e v e r a l  municipal  o f f i c i a l s .  The s i g h t  of t h e s e  brought t h e  
crowd t o  new excesses .  The crowd j e e r e d  t h e  P r e f e c t ,  t h r ea t en -  
i n g ' t o  throw him i n  t h e  cana l ,  and f o r c e d  him t o  f l e e  t o  t h e  
s i d e  of t h e  General.  A h a i l  of i t o n e s  thrown a t  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  
by t h e -  crowd s t r u c k . t h e  General on t h e  head 'and  t h e  deputy 
mayor on the  f a c e .  The l a t t e r  l a t e r  submit ted h i s  res igna-  
t i o n .  The crowd then  became s t i l l  more th rea t en ing .  Four 
o f f i c e r s  of t h e  Guard l e f t  t h e i r  t r o o p s , t o  harangue t h e  crowd, 
w i th  some e f f e c t .  "We'll obey you", c r i e d  some of t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
r e s i d e n t s  of Carcassone, "for  you a r e  good p a t r i o t s " .  . The 
crowd d i spe r sed .  Calm re tu rned ,  and t h e  n i g h t  p a s s e d . q u i e t l y .  
Now t h a t  t h e s e  dep lo rab le  events  have occurred ,  t h e  Bishop 
and t h e  P r e f e c t  can no longer  do us  any good; t h e i r  presence 
a l o n e  c r e a t e s  g e n e r a l  antagonism and ferment .  The most peaceable 
and r e s p e c t a b l e  c i t i z e n s  a r e  hur ry ing  t o  s i g n  a  p e t i t i o n  t o  
t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  seeking  t h e  removal of t h e  P r e f e c t  and t h e  
t r a n s f e r  of t h e  Bishop. 
The a u t h o r i t i e s  have been as tonished  a t  t h e  moral a u t h o r i t y  
over t h e  crowds shown by t h e  Nat iona l  Guard . . . 
(Le - C o n s t i t u t i o n n e l ,  March 19 ,  1832).  
Some of t h e  a v a i l a b l e  accounts  a r e  more d e t a i l e d  than  t h i s  one, a  m a j o r i t y  of 
them ske tch ie r?  Taken - toge the r ,  t h e  approximately 1,400 d i s tu rbance  r e p o r t s  
from 1830 through 1960 c o n s t i t u t e  a  comprehensive sample of even t s  i n  which 
men were s u f f i c i e n t l y  committed t o  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  t o  t a k e  v i o l e n t  a c t i o n ,  
p lus  informat ion  on t h e  c o n t e x t s  of t h e  even t s .  
Our procedure y i e l d s ,  s o  f a r  a s  we can t e l l ,  a  more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
sample of v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s  than  would r e l i a n c e  on s t anda rd  h i s t o r i e s  o r  on 
any combination of major s e r i e s  of documents a v a i l a b l e  t o  French h i s t o r i a n s  
f o r  t h e  per iod  i n  ques t ion .  Y e t  i t  tends  t o  under represent  a r e a s  and segments 
of t h e  popula t ion  which a r e  e i t h e r  l e s s  a c c e s s i b l e  o r  l e s s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  
, j o u r n a l i s t s .  Th i s  b i a s  i s  probably g r e a t e r  i n  t imes of c r i s i s  a t  t h e  c e n t e r ,  
which draw a t t e n t i o n  away from t h e  r e s t  of t h e  world. 
Yet t h e  gene ra l  b i a s  i s  endemic, and probably cons t an t  over s h o r t  
per iods .  The method appears  t o  cap tu re  t h e  gene ra l  f l u c t u a t i o n  of c o n f l i c t  over 
t i m e  f a i r l y  w e l l .  A comparison between t h e  number of d i s t u r b a n c e s  i n  t h e  
sample and those  mentioned i n  t h e  inventory  of two of t h e  s t anda rd  a r c h i v a l  
3  0 
s e r i e s  on t h e  i p t e r n a l  p o l i c i n g  of France (Archives Na t iona le s  B B ~ ~  and BB ) 
y i e l d s  t h e  fo l lowing  numbers of d i s tu rbances  by q u a r t e r  from 1830 through 1832: 
*On t h e  b a s i s  of t h i s  r e p o r t  and two o t h e r s ,  a l l  drawn from Le C o n s t i t u t i o n n e l ,  
our coders  es t imated  t h e  t o t a l  number of p a r t i c i p a n t s  a t  4 0 F t o  600, and broke 
them i n t o  two formations:  one a  "crowd of common ideology" and t h e  o t h e r  one a  
Nat iona l  Guard p l u s  p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s .  
1 . 2  2 3 '  - - 1 2 2 4  - 1 2 2 5 .  - TOTAL 
sample 2 5 2 5 1 8  9 4 7 . 3 .  1 7 . 4 2  7 2 141  
a r c h i v e  5 1 47 17 1 5 4 4 4  9 1 2  1 0  7 135 
The comparison i s  weakened somewhat by t h e  imprec is ion  of t h e  i n v e n t o r i e s  
concerning t h e  nhnber of p a r t i c i p a n t s  and e x t e n t  of . v i o l e n c e  i n  t h e  smal le r  
c o n f l i c t s  and by t h e i r  tendency t o  lump t o g e t h e r  a number of r e l a t e d  even t s  
(no tab ly  t h e  m u l t i p l e  counter - revolu t ionary  movements i n  t h e  West dur ing  t h e  
second q u a r t e r  of 1832) i n t o  a  s i n g l e  i tem. But i n  gene ra l  t h e  swings i n  
f r equenc ie s  correspond t o  t hose  of our sample ( r  = .52) .  For t h a t  reason ,  i t -  
may- be  u s e f u l  t o  e x t e n d , t h e  s e r i e s  back a  few yea r s  i n  t ime v i a  t h e  a r c h i v a l  
m a t e r i a l s :  
sample -- - - -- -- 5 0 2 3 68 
a r c h i v e  .13  11 1 3  22 7 0 27 38 
The counts  show a much h igher  frequency of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  immediately 
a f t e r  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  than  i n  t h e  yea r s  b e f o r e ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  accumulation of a  
c e r t a i n  number of food r i o t s  i n  1829. The obse rva t ion ,  which is  re in fo rced  
by t h e  q u a r t e r l y  count presented  above, w i l l  t a k e  on some importance l a t e r .  
I 
A s  we completed our  enumeration of d i s t u r b a n c e s  meeting ou r  c r i t e r i a ,  
we coded them ex tens ive ly  i n . a  uniform manner.. That involved breaking t h e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  each event  i n t o  "formations" -- s e t s  of persons . a c t i n g  
. . 
t oge the r  -- and desc r ib ing  each fo rma t ion ' s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and a c t i o n s  
s e p a r a t e l y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e  s e t t i n g  and t h e  d i s tu rbance  a s  a  
whole. The i t e m . s  coded ranged from m u l t i p l e  measures of t h e  s c a l e  of t h e  
d i s tu rbance  t o  d e t a i l e d  sequences ,of  a c t i o n  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  format ions  t o  
manifest  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  I n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  however, we draw 
only  on our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  of formations and our  e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  number of 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  each d i s tu rbance .  
Here w e  ana lyze  o n l y  one small  segment of t h e  sample: The d i s t u r b a n c e s  
recorded from t h e  yea r s  1830, 1831, 1832. Those events  i nc lude  a l l  t h e  l a r g e r  
v i o l e n t  encounters  which were p a r t  of t h e  Revolution of 1830, bu t  t hey  a l s o  
inc lude  a number of small i n c i d e n t s  t o  which h i s t o r i a n s  have n o t  a t t r i b u t e d  
any p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Inc lus iveness  i s  a v i r t u e ,  f o r  i t  
permi ts  u s  t o  s tudy  how t h e  occurrence of r e v o l u t i o n  a f f e c t s  t h e  whole p a t t e r n  
of v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t .  
The Revolution of 1830 
The "Three Glor ious  Days" of J u l y ,  1830, brought about  a popular  over- 
throw of entrenched power, one which s p e l l e d  t h e  d e f i n i t i v e  end of t h e  Bourbon 
monarchy i n  France and l e d  t o  a sweeping change i n  t h e  personnel  of t h e  
government's upper eche lons .  ( I n  our gene ra l  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  con tex t ,  we r e l y  
e s p e c i a l l y  on t h e  fo l lowing  accounts:  Aguet (1954), Dolleans (1967),  
Cheval ier  (1958),  Labrousee (n.d.) ,  Mantoux (1901), Gi rard  (1961),  Lhomme 
(19601, and Pinkney (1964).)  I n  p l ace  of t h e  Bourbon Char les  X,  t h e  
Revolution e l eva t ed  Louis-Phi l ippe of Orleans t o  t h e  throne  - no t  a s  King of 
France, bu t  a s  "King of t h e  French." The r e v o l u t i o n  c u r t a i l e d  t h e  power of 
t h e  o ld  landed a r i s t o c r a c y  and i n s t i t u t e d  a regime based on t h e  ascendant  
upper b o ~ r g e o i s ~ i e ,  b r ing ing  France 'one s t e p  c l o s e r  t o  par l iamentary  democracy. 
Nor d id  t h e s e  changes come without  bloodshed. I n  t h e  course  of t h e  "Three 
Glorious Days" of f i g h t i n g  between in su rgen t s  a n d . t h e  army i n  t h e  s t r e e t s  of 
P a r i s ,  some'two thousand Frenchmen l o s t  t h e i r  l i v e s .  
The Revolution of 1830 d id  not  e x c i t e  t h e  popular involvement of 1848. 
It d i d  no t  accomplish t h e  sweeping rearrangements  of 1789. Its rank  and f i l e  
d i d  n o t  s h a r e  t h e  single-minded commitment t o  a r evo lu t iona ry  program of t h e  
Communards of 1871. It was no l e s s  a r e v o l u t i o n  f o r  a l l  t h a t .  I n  our view, 
, 
t h e  e f f o r t  t o  s i n g l e  out  a c l a s s  of " t rue"  r e v o l u t i o n s  through t h e  ex tens iveness  
of popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  t h e  depth-  of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  changes r e s u l t i n g  from 
t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power o r  t h e  r ad i ca l i sm of t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
d e f e a t s  i t s e l f .  It makes c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  phenomenon t o  be  
- 
examined j u s t  t hose  f e a t u r e s  which a r e  h a r d e s t  t o  d e t e c t ,  and which ought t o  be 
t r e a t e d .  a s  v a r i a b l e s .  It makes v i r t u a l l y  imposs ib le  what i s  a l r e a d y  a very  
d i f f i c u l t  t a s k :  analyzing what d i s t i n g u i s h e s  those  t r a n s f e r s  of c o n t r o l  over 
governments which involve  massive popular  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and widespread 
. . > ,. 
s t r u c t u r a l  change from t h o s e  which do no t .  Employing t h e  more s t r i c t l y  
p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  of m u l t i p l e  sovere ignty  makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  1830 brought 
. . 
~ r a n c e  a genuine r evo lu t ion .  Once we examine 1830 o u t s i d e  t h e  shadows of 
1789 and 1848, moreover, we can s e e  w e l l  enough t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power 
were f a r  more ex tens ive  than  appears  a t  f i r s t  glance.  
Who took p a r t ?  Who were t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y  on t h e  eve of t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  who. t h e  contenders  t q s t i n g  one ano the r  i n  t h e  r d v o l u t i o ~ a r y  ,and 
. . 
pos t - revolu t ionary  power s t r u g g l e s ?  Jean  ~homme's summary i s  convenient :  
F i r s t ,  t h e  backers  of Char les  X, t h e  most powerful group up t o  t h e  Revolution; 
Lhomme s e e s  them a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f . t h e  landed a r i s t o c r a c y .  Second, poised 
- .  . , . . . . 
. a g a i n s t  t h i s  group, another  p r iv i l eged  element:  a c o u n t e r - e l i t e  composed of 
t h e  upper bourgeois ie ,  w i th  a c t i v i s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  t h e  Chamber of 
. . < '  . , . 
Deputies ,  the '  p r e s s  and o the r  key p o s i t i o n s .  I n  terms of t h e  conceptual  scheme 
. . . . 
w e  a re .employing ,  b o t h . t h e s e  groups count a s  members of t h e  p o l i t y ;  t h e r e  a r e ;  
of course ,  o t h e r s ,  bu t  t hey  ma t t e r  l e s s  f o r  t h e  present  a n a l y s i s .  Another two 
groups i d e n t i f i e d  by Lhomme a s  a c t i v e  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e s t s  of t h i s  per iod  
were t h e  numerous urban working c l a s s e s  -- poor,  i n a r t i c u l a t e ,  and badly  
organized,  bu t  s t i l l  capable  of some degree of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  -- and t h e  
r u r a l  poor,  d e s t i t u t e  a s  t h e i r  urban coun te rpa r t s  bu t  d i f f e r e n t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n .  These l a t t e r  groups were a c t i v e  contenders  i n  t h e  power s t r u g g l e  
dur ing  t h e  yea r s  under s tudy ,  b u t  were excluded by t h e  f i r s t  two from membership 
i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t y .  
These rough c a t e g o r i e s ,  obviously,  s imp l i fy  enormously a r i c h ,  complex 
c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e .  For most purposes,  a c l a s s  a n a l y s t  of t h i s  per iod  would want 
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  expanding c l a s s  of smal l  manufacturers  from t h e  world of 
smal l  craf tsmen and shopkeepers which suppl ied  so  many of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
a c t i v i s t s  from 1789 t o  1848, t h e  t r u e  peasants  from t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o l e t a r i a t ,  
t h e  f a c t o r y  workers from t h e  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r e r s ,  and s o  on. These d i s t i n c t i o n s  
ma t t e r  a g r e a t  d e a l  t o  our  more r e f ined  t r ea tmen t s  of n ine t een th  cen tu ry  
c o n f l i c t s .  For p re sen t  purposes,  t h e  would simply obscure t h e  g e n e r a l  
argument. 
Our c a t e g o r i e s ,  f o r  a l l  t h e i r  crudeness ,  t ake  u s  a g i a n t  s t e p  toward a 
more s u b t l e  understanding of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  even t s  themselves; a l though 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  groups a l l  had t h e i r  r o l e s  t o  p l a y  i n  t h e  
Three Glor ious  Days, t hey  were d i f f e r e n t  r o l e s  indeed. The Revolut ion came 
a f t e r  a per iod  of smoldering i f  u n s p i r i t e d  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  government 
and t h e  bourgeois  c o u n t e r - e l i t e .  The immediate spur  t o  a c t i o n  came on J u l y  25 
when t h e  government, f a c i n g  a d e f e a t  from i t s  a n t a g o n i s t s  i n  t h e  Chamber of 
Deputies ,  promulgated a s e r i e s  of measures suspending freedom of t h e  p r e s s ,  
d i s s o l v i n g  t h e  r e c e n t l y  e l e c t e d  Chamber, and r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  f r a n c h i s e .  The. 
par l iamentary  oppos i t i on  -- t h e  bourgeois  c o u n t e r - e l i t e  -- c a l l e d  on. t h e  
. . 
n a t i o n  t o  r e s i s t ,  pogt ing placards,  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  throughout P a r i s .  Perhaps . . 
more impor tan t ,  t h e  oppos i t i on  p r e s s  c losed  down i n  response t o  t h e  government's 
. . . 
measures, sending t h e  p r i n t e r s ,  and o the r  workers i n t o  t h e  s t r e e t s .  News and 
a g i t a t i o n  spread  through t h e  e x i s t i n g  networks of neighborhood, work.and l o c a l  
. , 
p o l i t i c a l  o rgan iza t ion .  By J u l y  27 b a r r i c a d e s  had appeared i n  t h e  c i t y  -- 
. . 
e s p e c i a l l y  . i n  . t h e  o ld ,working-c lass  neighborhoods -- ,and - f i g h t i n g  between 
in su rgen t s  and ' t he  army had begun. By t h e  29th ,  t h e  cha l l enge r s  had won t h e  
day. The king abdica ted  and f l e d  t h e  country;  t h e  Duke of Orleans w a s  i n s t a l l e d  
i n  h i s  p lace .  Three s h o r t  days s u f f i c e d  t o  depose t h e  last  of t h e  Bourbons 
and' s h i f t  t h e  r e i n s  of power. 
We recount  t h e  even t s  p a r t l y  t o  emphasize t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  c o a l i t i o n  
which e f f e c t e d  t h e  overthrow. The bases  f o r  a c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  working- 
c l a s s  cha l l enge r s  and .  t h e  bourgeois  members of t h e  p o l i t y  were qu i . t e ' . d i f f e r en , t .  
, . 
David p inkqeyls  r e c e n t  work, on t h e  Par i s ,  r evo lu t ion  of 1830 has s h o k  t h a t  
t h e  d i s p a r i t i e s  were s o  g r e a t  t h a t  unanimity (however one might reckon i t )  was 
impossible .  Pinkney argues ,  f o r  example, t h a t  t h e  working-class crowd were 
. . 
uninvolved i n  t h e  q u a r r e l  between t h e  government a n d .  i t s  e l i t e  an t agon i s t s :  
. . . thousands of P a r i s  workingmen dur ing  t h e  depress ion  
yea r s  of t h e  l a t e  1820s and e a r l y  1830s.had s p e c i f i c  gr ievances  
-- l a c k  of work, low wages, t h e  h igh  p r i c e  of bread -- that had 
nothing . . t o  do wi th  t h e  d i s p u t e  over censorsh ip  t h a t . a l i e n a t e d  
t h e  p r i n t e r s  and j o u r n a l i s t s  from t h e  Pol ignac min i s t ry .  
. ( 1 9 6 4 , p . 2 )  . . . . . . 
The convent iona l  way t o  d e a l  w i th  t h i s  d i screpancy  has  been t o  t r e a t  t h e  
workers a s  impel led ,  r a t h e r  b l i n d l y ,  by hardship ;  Pinkney's  a n a l y s i s ,  however, 
makes i t  e a s i e r  t o  s e e  t h a t  a  genuine c o a l i t i o n  of groups wi th  r a t h e r  
d i f f e r e n t  o b j e c t i v e s  was a t  work i n  t h e  e a r l y  r evo lu t ion .  The n a t u r e  of t h e  
c o a l i t i o n  adds i r o n y  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l though few bourgeois  d i ed  i n  t h e  
P a r i s i a n  events  i n  comparison t o  t h e  t e r r i b l e  t o l l  of workers,  t h e  upper 
bourgeois  picked up t h e  p i eces ,  s e t  t h e  c a s t  of t h e  new government and 
occupied t h e  s t a t i o n s  of power w i t h i n  i t .  
Th i s  account of t h e  P a r i s  days a l s o  provides  ano the r  ground f o r  
skept ic i sm about  t hose  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  t h e o r i e s  of r e v o l u t i o n  which i m p l i c i t l y  
p o s i t  a  s i n g l e  s t a t e  of mind o r  shared t e n s i o n  through e n t i r e  popula t ions .  
For t h e  a c t u a l  change i n  government was accomplished both  i n  a  remarkably 
s h o r t  t ime and through t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of a  small segment of t h e  French 
populace: perhaps twenty thousand p a r t i c i p a n t s  - l e s s  than  a  hundredth of one 
percent  - of a  n a t i o n  of twenty-five m i l l i o n .  C e r t a i n l y  t h e s e  twenty thousand 
people were i n  a  s t r a t e g i c  l o c a t i o n .  C e r t a i n l y  many o t h e r  non-combatant 
Frenchmen shared  a t  l e a s t  some of t h e i r  ou t look .  But on ly  t h e  r a s h e s t  
observer  could au toma t i ca l ly  a s c r i b e  t h e  pe rcep t ions ,  g r ievances  and d e s i r e s  
of t hose  who fought  t o  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  populace. A minor i ty  of a  s p e c i f i c  
c l a s s  i n  a  s i n g l e  c i t y  were a b l e  t o  d i s lodge  t h e  Bourbon regime from i t s  
p o s i t i o n  of power. To s t a k e  one 's  exp lana t ion  of t h e  change of government 
on what t h e  r e s t  of t h e  French n a t i o n  was th ink ing  o r  f e e l i n g  seems t o  u s  
unwarranted and r i s k y .  
I n s t e a d ,  t h e  model of r e v o l u t i o n  a l r e a d y  presented d i r e c t s  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  form, l ocus  and i n t e n s i t y  of c o n f l i c t  a s  t h e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  
power con t inues .  I f  t h e  model is  c o r r e c t ,  we should e x p e c t . t o  f i n d :  
1 )  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r i s e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  of c o n f l i c t  a f t e r  t h e  
incep t ion  of t h e  r evo lu t ion ,  a s  a )  t h e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power . 
over  t h e  c e n t r a l  governmental appa ra tus  g e n e r a l i z e s ;  b )  a l l  
contenders  f i n d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t y  open t o  
test and change; c )  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  which a c q u i r e s  c o n t r o l  
over  t h e  c e n t e r  a t t empt s  t o  reimpose c o n t r o l  over  t h e  
p e r i p h e r a l  segments of t he  popula t ion  a s  a  whole; 
2) a  movement of c o n f l i c t  toward t h e  c e n t e r s  of power 
a $  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  begins ,  and towaid  t h e  per iphery  a s  i t  
proceeds t o  r e impos i t i on  of c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  over t h e  
remainder of t h e  popula t ion ;  
3)  an inc reased  u s e  of spec i a l i zed  r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  a s  
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  c o n s o l i d a t e s  i t s  c o n t r o l  over 
t h e  c e n t e r ,  demobil izes  some of t h e  contenders  which took 
. a n  act5ve p a r t  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l - . s e i z u r e .  of power, and extends 
i t s  c o n t r o l  t o  t h e  per iphery ;  , . .  - . 
4 )  a  &nera l .  " p o l i t i c i z ? t i ~ n "  of c o n f l i c t  w i th  and a f t e r  
. . t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  a s  t h e - e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
.. s i t u a t i o n , . . e n c o u r a g e s  a l l  contenders  t o  t e s t  e a c h . o t h e r  
i n  o r d e r  t o . m a i n t a i n . o , r  aggrandize t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s ,  a n d . a s .  
every con£l ic  t .  comes t o  have. some .. s i g n i f i c a n c e  f ,or  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  p o l i t y  to:emerge- from t h e  r .evolu t ion ;  
. 5) a  genera.1 tendency f o r  both t h e .  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  and t h e  
i n t e n s i t y  of c o n f l i c t s  t o  vary  as a d i r e c t  func t ion  of,  
. . ' . .. - .  . < - .  
t h e  proximity of d i f f e r e n t  segments of t h e  popula t ion  
t o  t h e  cen te r .  
Now, t h e s e  i n f e r e n c e s  from our gene ra l  scheme obviously assume a h igh ly  
c e n t r a l i z e d  government ; t hey  very' l i k e l y  draw some of t h e i r  p l a u s i b i l i t y  
from t h e i r  f i t  w i th  what we a l r eady  know t o  be  t h e  common run  of modern 
European experience.  The peasant  wars so powerful ly  analyzed by E r i c  Wolf 
(1969), on t h e  o the r  hand, w i l l  only f i t  t h e s e  s t a t emen t s  a f t e r  some tugging 
and squeezing. We claim only  t h a t  t hese  a r e  reasonable  i n f e r e n c e s  from our  
argument t o  t h e  s o r t s  of c e n t r a l i z e d  governments modern Europe did produce, 
and t h e r e f o r e  t o  t h e  p o l i t i e s  which have suppl ied  t h e o r i s t s  of r e v o l u t i o n  
wi th  most of t h e i r  c l a s s i c  c a s e s ,  and t h a t  "na tu ra l  h i s t o r y "  schemes e i t h e r  
provide no in fe rences  regard ing  t h e s e  m a t t e r s  or  suggest  c o n t r a r y  ones.  
The Timing of C o l l e c t i v e  Violence 
A s  p re l iminary  t e s t s  of t hese  a s s e r t i o n s ,  l e t  u s  examine d a t a  concerning 
t h e  t iming,  l o c u s  and p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h i n  France from 1830 
through 1832. F i r s t ,  t iming.  Figure 1 d i s p l a y s  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
v io l ence  by q u a r t e r  from January 1830 t o  December 1832, i n  terms of numbers of 
d i s tu rbances  and es t imated  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  them. (The e s t i m a t i n g  procedure a )  
g i v e s  precedence t o  s p e c i f i c  numbers r epo r t ed  i n  t h e  accounts  used, b)  permi ts  
t h e  coder t o  draw i n f e r e n c e s  from t h e  t e r r i t o r y  occupied by t h e  d i s tu rbance ,  
t h e  number of a r r e s t s  and c a s u a l t i e s  and t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  words used by 
wi tnesses ,  c )  a s s i g n s  t o  t hose  d i s tu rbances  f o r  which t h e r e  i s  too  l i t t l e  
information t o  make even t h a t  s o r t  of judgment -- i n  t h i s  c a s e  8 of t h e  141  
d i s tu rbances  -- t he  mean va lue  of t h e  e s t ima te s  f o r  o t h e r  d i s tu rbances  i n  t h e  
same q u a r t e r . )  On t h e  whole, t h e  curves of d i s tu rbances  and of p a r t i c i p a n t s  

move t o g e t h e r .  The l a r g e s t  except ion  i n  t h e  t h r e e  y e a r s  is t h e  t h i r d  q u a r t e r  
of 1831, dur ing  which t h e  number of d i s tu rbances  dec l ined  t o  t h r e e ,  bu t  t h e  
famous November i n s u r r e c t i o n  i n  Lyon brought t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  up t o  over  
seventeen thousand. The graph a l s o  d i s p l a y s  t h e  gene ra l  tendency f o r  t h e  
average s i z e  of d i s tu rbances  t o  r i s e  i n  t imes  of widespread c o n f l i c t  l i k e  
J u l y  1830 and June 1832. 
Perhaps t h e  most remarkable t h i n g  shown i n  t h e s e  curves  i s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
quiescence of France dur ing  t h e  six-month per iod  immediately p r i o r  t o  t h e  
r evo lu t ion .  From t h e  f i r s t  of January  t o  t h e  end of June 1830, we d i scove r  a 
t o t a l  of s i x  d i s tu rbances .  During t h e  f i v e  months from t h e  beginning of August 
t o  t h e  end of t h e  yea r ,  however, t h e r e  a r e  a  t o t a l  of t h i r t y - f i v e .  Th i s  
accords  badly wi th  those  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  t h e o r i e s  which p o s i t  a  gradual  bu i ld -  
up of excitement o r  t ens ion  dur ing  t h e  pre- revolu t ionary  pe r iod ,  followed by 
a  down-turn and genera l  subsidence once t h e  r evo lu t ion  i s  accomplished. Indeed,  
P a r i s  i t s e l f ,  t h e  s i t e  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  and t h e  a r e a  where t h e  d a t a  on d i s -  
tu rbances  a r e  most complete, shows no v io l ence  above our  minimum s c a l e  between 
the  f i r s t  of t h e  year  and t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  days. Nor do 1831 and 1832 show 
much of a  sys temat ic  decrescendo of v io l ence  o r  homeostat ic  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  
e a r l i e r  equi l ibr ium.  1831, i t  i s  t r u e ,  i s  cons iderably  l e s s  v i o l e n t  than  t h e  
second h a l f  of 1830, ye t  1831 remains more v i o l e n t  s t i l l  than t h e  f i r s t  s i x  
months of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  year .  And 1832, though showing a  lower inc idence  
of v io l ence  per  month than  t h e  l a s t  h a l f  of 1830, n e v e r t h e l e s s  shows more than  
twice a s  many i n c i d e n t s  a s  1831 and many more per  month than  t h e  pre- .. . . 
r evo lu t iona ry  period of 1830. Indeed, an examination of our  sample shows 
t h a t  1832 produced t h e  g r e a t e s t  number of v i o l e n t  i n c i d e n t s  of any y e a r ' d u r i n g  
t h e  1830-1860 per iod .  By any reckoning,  t h e  "Three Glor ious  ~ a y s "  of J u l y ,  
1830, mark tlie beginning,  r a t h e r . t h a n  t h e  climax, o f - a  t u r b u l e n t  per iod  i n  
French h i s t o r y .  
A clos,er  l ook . . a t  t h e  i n c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  months a f t e r  . t he  r evo lu t ion  i n  
1830 shows a  s t i l l  more i n t e r e s t i n g  p a t t e r n  of development of r evo lu t iona ry  
v io lence .  The r e v o l u t i o n  i t s e r f  had played ou t  w i th in  a remarkably s h o r t  
per iod  of t ime. Within f i v e  days of t h e  f i r s t  s i g n s  of popular  h o s t i l i t y  t o  
t h e  regime i n  P a r i s ,  and a f t e r  j u s t  t h r e e  days of f i g h t i n g ,  t h e  Bourbon 
monarchy f e l i  f o r  good; given t h e  s t a t e  of communications a t  t h a t  t ime, t h e  
r evo lu t ion  was an  accomplished f a c t  be fo re  most of t h e  country had heard about 
if. Y e t  - t h e  . ' i ees tab l i shment  of s i n g l e  sovere ignty  through France a s  a  
whole took months, and remained open t o  s e r i o u s  cha l lenge  bo th  i n  P a r i s  and 
i n  t h e  provinces f o r  another  two years .  Most of t h e  major c i t i e s  of France 
were t h e  scenes of sympathet ic  responses as soon a s  news of t h e  P a r i s i a n  
i n s u r r e c t i o n  reached them. I n  Nantes,  f o r  example: 
The J u l y  Ordinances were known.the morning of t h e  29th.  They 
had a  powerful impact.  .Fee l ings . r an  h igh  a l l  day and d i s o r d e r l y  
crowds gathered i n  f r o n t  of t h e  t h e a t e r  t h a t  evening. .The 
gendarmes, and t h e  s o l d i e r s  of t h e  Tenth Line Regiment 
in te rvened  and r e s t o r e d  o rde r .  F i f t e e n  demonstrators  were 
a r r e s t e d  and taken t o  t h e  ~ h c t e a u .  
The next  morning, t h e r e  was g r e a t  a g i t a t i o n ,  and i t ,  
spread t o  t h e  masses. The merchants and t h e  upper 
bourgeois ie  d id  no t  h ide  t h e i r  f e a r s .  They asked f o r  t h e  
rees tab l i shment  of t h e  Nat iona l  Guard, bu t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  d id  
no t  seem i n c l i n e d  t o  l i s t e n  t o  them! 
The mayor was s t r o n g l y  urged . . . t o  f r e e  t h e  
h demonstrators  who had been imprisoned i n  t h e  Chateau 
t h e  n i g h t  before .  He s a i d  a l l  he could do was speak 
t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  commander. 
Af t e r  t h a t  r e p l y ,  a  group formed and headed f o r  t h e  
headquar te rs  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  d i v i s i o n ,  grew a long  t h e  
way, and included a  hundred-odd persons when i t  got  t o  
t h e  P lace  Louis X V I .  There i t  found a  detachment of t h e  
Tenth i n  b a t t l e  formation be fo re  t h e  headquar te rs .  
I n  t h e  midst  of t h e  shou t s  and imprecat ions of t h e  crowd, 
someone f i r e d  a  gun. The s o l d i e r s  responded wi th  a  
v o l l e y .  The demonstrators  f l e d ,  w i th  seven of them 
shot  t o  dea th  and some f o r t y  of them more o r  l e s s  
s e r i o u s l y  wounded. 
The populace invaded t h e  guard house and disarmed t h e  
s o l d i e r s  on duty t h e r e .  The m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  
l i m i t e d  t h e i r  a c t i o n  t o  s ecu r ing  t h e  ~h^a teau  and t h e  P lace  
Louis X V I ,  and t h e  c i t y  was abandoned t o  i t s e l f .  Some 
c i t i z e n s  who had met a t  t h e  Bourse dur ing  t h e  day 
organized p a t r o l s  whichwdked t h e  c i t y  t h a t  n i g h t  and 
maintained order .  
The members of t h e  cou r t  and t h e  Chamber of Commerce 
took t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  r e e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  Nat iona l  Guard 
and appealed t o  t h e  l o y a l t y  of t h e i r  f e l l o w  c i t i z e n s  i n  a 
n o t i c e  posted Saturday,  J u l y  31. 
Because of a  de lay  i n  t h e  ma i l s ,  on ly  on t h e  n i g h t  of . .. . - . . . .. . . 
August 1 d i d  people l e a r n  t h e  d e p a r t u r e - o f  Char les  X and 
. . 
t h e  es tab l i shment  of a  p rov i s iona l  government. 
. . ' .  
The p r e f e c t  a n d . t h e  mayor, cons ider ing  t h e  game l o s t ,  
. . 
, . . .  
1 e f t . t h e  c i t y  on t h e . 2 n d ;  t h a t  n i g h t  g e n e r a l  Despinois ,  
. ' 2  . 
t ak ing  p a r t  of h i s  g a r r i s o n  wi th  him, headed , fo r  t h e  
. . . .  . 
>. 
Vendee, hoping t o  r a i s e  an i n s u r r e c t i o n  t h e r e .  
, . . . .   
The Na'tional Guard organized.  L t .  General Dumoutier, 
who l i v e d  n e a r  t h e  c i t y ,  took command. . ,  
Mayet,' s e n i o r  member of the-  p r e f e c t o r a l  c o u n c i l ,  took 
over d i r e c t i o n  of departmental  a f f a i r s  on t h e  3rd.  
. . 
O n  t h e . , 4 t h , - t h e  o f f i c i a l  news f i n a l l y  came. The t r i c o l o r  
.. ' 
f l a g  went up. On t h e  6 th ,  Dumoutier took .command of t h e  
Twelf th Div is ion .  ( ~ i b a u d i z r e  1905, 81-83; a  f a r  supe r io r  
. . . . . . 
account  appears  i n  Giraud-Mangin). . . ~. ,. . 
Between, t h e  t ime of -  t h e . r e v o l u t i o n  . . i n . P a r i s  and,August 4 ,  s i m i l a r  events  
broke out .  . . .  i n  Toulouse,~Bordeawc,,Lille, . . Amien,and Dijon. . A l l  . of t h e s e  i n c i d e n t s  
- 
represented.assertions,of s t r e n g t h  by l o c a l  r e p r e s e n , t a t i v e s . o f  t h e  f o r c e s  who 
had se i zed  power i n  P a r i s ,  I n  terms of o u r - p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  model of 
r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e s e  even t s  represented  t h e  f i r s t  of a  s e r i e s  of t e s t s  among 
v a r i o u s  members of t h e  p o l i t y  and contenders  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power t o  determine 
t h e  conc re t e  p,ower r e l a t i o n s  which would.r ,esul t  f rom. the  r evo lu t iona ry  change 
a t  t h e  center . .  .. ;,. .. . . . . . . . 
.. Thqse.. e s s e n t i a l l y  u.rban, events,  played thems,elves out ,  a lmost .  immediately 
a f t e r  t h e  revolu t ion , . .~even  though t h e  o v e r a l l  l e v e l  of .violence h i t , a n o t h e r .  
peak be fo re  t h e  end of t h e  year .  I n f l a t i n g  t h e  r a t e s  dur ing  t h e  remainder of 
1830 were another  k ind  of v i o l e n t  con f ron ta t ion ,  one p i t t i n g  a d i f f e r e n t  combina- 
t i o n  of p a r t i e s  a g a i n s t  one another  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  kind of mutual t e s t i n g .  These 
were t h e  small-town and r u r a l  outbreaks of a t t a c k s  a g a i n s t  t h e  agen t s  and 
symbols of c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  favored f o r  such a t t a c k s  were t h e  
t a x a t i o n  o f f i c e s  by which P a r i s  co l l ec t ed  i t s  much-detested i n t e r n a l  t a x e s  and 
which c u t  t h e  income of  l o c a l  farmers whi le  r a i s i n g  t h e  l e v e l  of food p r i c e s  i n  
t h e  c i t i e s  and towns. For example, an  account  of a t a x  r i o t  i n  t h e  Champagne 
c i t y  of Epernay i n  December, 1830 begins: 
S i x  hundred wine growers descended on t h e  house of t h e  c o l l e c t e r  
of e x c i s e ,  sacked h i s  o f f i c e s ,  se ized  h i s  record  books, and 
burned them i n  t h e  square by the  c i t y  h a l l .  (Archives Nat iona les  
BB18 1191).  
and then goes on t o  g i v e  d e t a i l s :  The presences  of women and c h i l d r e n  i n  t h e  
crowd, t h e  r e f u s a l  of p a r t  of t h e  National  Guard ( themselves r e c r u i t e d  from 
t h e  winegrowers) t o  a c t  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  b r o t h e r s ,  t h e  r eques t  f o r  t roops  from 
o u t s i d e ,  t h e  d i s p e r s a l  of t h e  r i o t e r s .  Another account of t h e  same i n c i d e n t  
from a  newspaper source  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  mayor of t h e  town and o t h e r  "good 
c i t i z e n s "  t r i e d  t o  p reven t  t h e  invas ion ,  bu t  t o  no a v a i l .  
At tacks  l i k e  t h i s  one, endemic during t h i s  pe r iod ,  were no mere symbolic 
ges tu re s .  One of t h e  main p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  of t h e  t ime -- both be fo re  and 
a f t e r  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  -- w a s  t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  c e n t r a l  government t o  squeeze 
t axes  ou t  of t h e  r u r a l  populace. These even t s  i n  t h e  f a l l  of 1830 r e p r e s e n t  
another  process  of t e s t i n g ,  a s  those  i n  c o n t r o l  of t h e  c e n t r a l  government 
s t rugg led  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  i t s  power and t o  exclude t h e  r u r a l  poor from p a r t i c i -  
p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i t y .  T h e . f a c t  of a  change of power a t  t h e  top  had r e s u l t e d  
i n  a  scramble f o r  p o s i t i o n  among t h e  o t h e r  contenders  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t y ,  wi th  
each group seeking t o  e s t a b l i s h  i t s  c la im f o r  what i t - s a w  a s  most c r u c i a l  t o  i t .  
The r u r a l  contenders  simply responded t o  t h e  new power arrangement a t  t h e  cen te r  
. . 
a s  an oppor tun i ty  t o  p r e s s  harder  than  ever  f o r  t h e  s a m e . i n t e r e s t s  which they  
had been pursuing a l l  a long .  
Nor w e r e ' t h e  r u r a l  poor t h e  only groups whose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a s s e r t e d  
t h e i r  c la ims  a g a i n s t - t h e  new government immediately a f t e r  t h e  r evo lu t ion .  
P a r i s  i t s e l f  w a s  t h e  scene of a  number of p r o t e s t s  from i ts  poorer  c i t i z e n s ;  
t h e . e v e n t s  of t h e  f a l l  demonstrated t h a t  t h e  c r i t i c a l  r o l e  of workers during 
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  had no t  l e d  t o  working-class suppor t  f o r  t h e  middle-class  
government. F i n a l l y ,  i n  December of 1830, t h e  t r i a l  of t h e  m i n i s t e r s  of deposed 
Char les  X ,  brought about  .A massive r i o t .  which rodked t h e  new government, It 
showed p l a i n l y  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  had n o t  " re -equi l ibra ted"  i t s e l f  during t h e  
months s i n c e  t h e  r evo lu t ion .  
Urbani ty and C o l l e c t i v e  Violence 
Another s i g n i f i c a n t  comparison i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  v i o l e n t  
c o l l e c t i v e  c o n f l i c t s  during t h i s -  per iod  l ies  i n  t h e  u rban i ty  of t h e i r  s e t t i n g s .  
Table 1 shows t h e  es t imated  number of p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  d i s tu rbances  during each 
per iod  by t h e  u rban i ty  of t h e  departments i n  which t h e  d i s tu rbances  occurred . ,  
(At' t h e  t ime,  France was divided i n t o  86 a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u n i t s ,  o r  departments,  
averaging about  375,000 i n  popuia t ion . )  The e n t r i e s  i n  each c e l l  a r e  r a t e s  
per  100,000 popula t ion ,  co r r ec t ed  t o  an annual  b a s i s .  Of course ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
a d i s tu rbance  took p l a c e - i n  a department w i t h  more t h a n - 1 5  percent  of its, '  
Table 1. Estimated Participants in Collective Violence per 100,000 Population 
by Urbanity of Department, 1830-32 (corrected to annual basis) 
. , 
Percent of popula- Period. Total Total 
tion in cities of Jan.-June July-Aug, Sept.-Dec. 1830- Part iciptnt s Population 
10, O O W  1830 1830 1830 1831 1832 1832 - - - (Thousands) - (Millions). 
TOTAL 13 573 175 120 193 158 154.2 32.5 
Total Participants 
(Thousands) 
r, participants x 
urban population 
popula t ion  i n  urban p l aces  does not  n e c e s s a r i l y  mean t h e  event i t , s e l f  was 
urban; a  d i s tu rbance  i n  an  urban department can s t i l l  t a k e  p l ace  o u t s i d e  t h e  
con f ines  of t h e  c i t y .  
The comparisons a r e  s t r i k i n g .  The urban departments show c o n s i s t e n t l y  
h ighe r  r a t e s  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  d i s tu rbances  throughout.  Never the less ,  t h e  
geographic . . p a t t e r n  v a r i e s  cons iderably  from one per iod  t o  t h e  next .  The 
. . 
c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a t  t h e  bottom of each column i n  Table 1 convenient ly 
summarize t h e  vary ing  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  u rban i ty  of a  
department and t h e  volume of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i t s  d i s tu rbances .  The c o e f f i c i e n t s  
d i s p l a y  both t h e  gene ra l  tendency of p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  d i s tu rbances  t o  concen t r a t e  
i n  t h e  more urban departments and t h e  sha rp  f l u c t u a t i o n  of t h e  p a t t e r n  from 
per iod  t o  per iod.  The r a p i d  geographic f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  i t s e l f  i s  a  f i n d i n g  of 
some importance, f o r  i t  sugges ts  t ~ o ~ i n t e r e s t i n g  c o n c l u s ~ o n s :  a )  t h e  locus  and 
c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  i s s u e s  about which Frenchmen were f i g h t i n g  s h i f t e d  d rama t i ca l ly  
a s  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  moved from phase t o  phase;  b) o the r  s t u d i e s  which have found 
s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s  . . between l e v e l s  of . c o n f l i c t  and s t r u c t u r a l . .  v a r i a b l e s  a t  a  s i n g l e  
. . . . , . . . 
p o i n t  i n  t ime may we l l  have mistaken h i s t o r i c a l l y  cont ingent  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  f o r  
g e n e r a l  e f f e c t s .  of s t ruc tu re . ,  
Nor does t h e  f a c t  t h a t  over t h e  long  run t h e  most urban departments , 
. - 
gene ra t e  t h e  h ighes t  r a t e s  of v io l ence  mean it i s  u rban iza t ion  a s  such which 
l e a d s  t o  v io lence .  Mul t ip le  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s  of t h e s e  same d a t a  p l u s  o t h e r  
i n d i c a t o r s  of . soc.ihl . .  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o£ t h e  departments , involved c o n s i s t e n t l y  
y i e l d  h igh  p ,os i t ive  weights  . f o r  u rban i ty ,  low p o s i t i v e  weights f o r  r a t e ,  of 
I 
i n c r e a s e  i n  urban popula t ion  f o r  t h e  per iod  1826-1831, and low nega t ive  weights  
f o r  n e t  migra t ion  dur ing  t h e  same per iod .  The presence of c i t i e s ,  i n  o the r  
' :', . . 
. . 
words, makes c o l l e c t i v e  v i o l e n c e  more l i k e l y ;  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n  presumably caused 
by r a p i d  growth -- o r  a t  l e a s t  by r a p i d  in-migration -- does n o t .  
How d i d  t h e  p a t t e r n  change a s  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  proceeded? During t h e  
pre- revolu t ionary  per iod ,  we f i n d  low r a t e s  throughout France; they  do n o t  
d i f f e r  g r e a t l y  among t h e  groups of departments.  The p i c t u r e  changes d r a s t i c -  
a l l y ,  however, once t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  g e t s  underway. During t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
per iod ,  t h e  e x t e n t  of v io l ence  r o s e  sha rp ly  f o r  a l l  c l a s s e s  of departments  
except  t h e  most r u r a l  ones; t h e  change produced a  s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
u rban i ty  and v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t .  I n  t h e  months fo l lowing  t h e  change of 
government t h e  d i s p a r i t y  between t h e  most and t h e  l e a s t  urban departments  
narrowed; t h e  r a t e s  i n  t h e  l e s s  urban departments r o s e ,  r e g i s t e r i n g  t h e  s h i f t  
of focus of c o n f l i c t  from t h e  l a r g e s t  urban c e n t e r s  toward t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  towns 
and t h e  count rys ide .  Concre te ly ,  t h e  swel l ing  of r a t e s  i n  t h e  less urban 
departments during t h e  c l o s i n g  months of 1830 r ep resen ted  t h e  spread of t a x  
r e b e l l i o n s  and s i m i l a r  forms of r e s i s t a n c e  t o  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l .  During 1831 and 
1832, t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between t h e  most and l e a s t  urban departments widened 
aga in ,  a l though i n  1831 t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  of t a x  c o n f l i c t s  i n  t h e  moderately 
r u r a l  departments whi le  s t r u g g l e s  among t h e  members of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  
a c c e l e r a t e d  i n  P a r i s  and o t h e r  l a r g e  c i t i e s  reduced t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
u rban i ty  and r a t e s  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  The l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  c o n f l i c t  of 1831 was 
t h e  bloody r e v o l t  of t h e  Lyon s i l k  workers. I n  1832, l e v e l s  of involvement i n  
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  r o s e  i n  a l l  c l a s s e s  of departments;  i n  A p r i l ,  May and June  
they  approached t h e  h e i g h t s  of J u l y  and August, 1830, a s  repea ted  s t r e e t - f i g h t i n g  
i n  P a r i s  coincided wi th  widespread g u e r r i l l a  i n  t h e  counter - revolu t ionary  West. 
There a r e  some s p e c i a l  p o i n t s  worth no t ing  i n  t h e  r a t e s  f o r  France a s  a  
whole. These f i g u r e s  should make i t  c l e a r  t h a t ,  however modest t h e  f i n a l  
rearrangements i n  French s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e -  b r o u g h t . a b o u t . , b y , t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e  
. . . .  , . . . . . , 
events  of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  per iod  i j i d . . ac t iva t e  . t h e  .French populace. . The 
number of p a r t i c i p a n t s  dur ing  t h e  two-month r e v b l u t i ~ x i a ~ j p e r i o d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  :.-., 
i n  t h e  most urban. departments ,  shows a  remarkably h igh  l e v e l  of involvement i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  t o t a l  popula t ion .  1830 may have lacked  t h e  long-term s o c i a l  
imp l i ca t ion  of t h e  Great Revolut ion of 1789, bu t  i t  w a s . c e r t a i n l y  no pa l ace  
coup, no ma t t e r  of i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  bulk  of t h e  French popula t ion .  
The P a r t i c i p a n t s  
S t i l l  a  f u r t h e r  comparison of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  process  
of r evo lu t ion  of d i f f e r e n t  groups w i t h i n  t h e  French p o l i t y  comes from an  a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  formations t ak ing  p a r t  i n  v i o l e n t  events .  A formation i s  a  group t ak ing  
an  independent r o l e  i n  a  d i s tu rbance ,  a s  reckoned by i t s  apparent  autonomy o r  
o rgan iza t ion ,  d i s t i n c t n e s s  of o b j e c t i v e s ,  e t c .  I n  some i n s t a n c e s ,  l i k e  t h e  
d e s t r u c t i o n  of government t a x a t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  dur ing  t h e  immediate pos t -  " 
r evo lu t iona ry  pe r iod ,  t h e  sample r eco rds  only  a  s i n g l e  formation,  s i n c e  t h e  
in su rgen t s  had no a n t a g o n i s t s  p re sen t  i n  person on t h e  scene. The more common 
case  i s  two formations c o n t e s t i n g  wi th  each o t h e r ,  wh i l e  some i n s t a n c e s  con ta in  
t h r e e  o r  more formations,  i n  d i f f e r e n t  combinations of a l l i a n c e  wi th  o r  
antagonism a g a i n s t  one ano the r .  For every i n c i d e n t  w e  have at tempted t o  
ga the r  a s  much informat ion  as p o s s i b l e  about  t h e  i d e n t i t y  of t h e  formations 
t ak ing  p a r t  and t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Th i s  makes i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  
compare, i n  ~ a b i e  2 ,  t h e  p ropor t iona te  involvement of v a r i o u s  k inds  of forma- 
t i o n s  throughout t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  period.  
Table 2: Types of Formations P a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  C o l l e c t i v e  Violence, 
1830-1832 (Percent  of t o t a l  i n  s p e c i f i e d  per iod)  
per iod  
Jan.-June July-Aug. Septa-Dec. 
Formation type  1830 1830 1830 1831 - 1382 T o t a l  
simple crowd 30.8 22.2 23.5 12.0 15.1 17.4 , 
Ideo log ica l  
group 
Occupational 
group 23.1 11.1 21.6 12.0 6.2 11.1 
Repressive 
f o r c e  7.7 25.9 33.3 42.0 41.8 37.3 
Other 38.5 11.1 15.7 10.0 8.2 11 .5  
T o t a l  100.1 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.1 99.9 
Number of 
Format i o n s  
Chi-square, 1 6  d . f .  = 39.1, p < . O 1  
The s h i f t s  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  dur ing  t h i s  per iod  a r e  worth no t ing  i n  d e t a i l ,  
f o r  t hey  demonstrate  a  number of changes suggested by our  model. Ove ra l l ,  
Table  2 shows a  broad t r end  toward t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of v i o l e n t  c o l l e c t i v e  
c o n f l i c t .  The "simple crowd" -- any group r e c r u i t e d  simply by v i r t u e  of i t s  
members having been i n  one p a r t i c u l a r  p l ace  a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t ime -- decreases  
i n  p ropor t iona te  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from i t s  pre- revolu t ionary  h igh  t o  a  markedly 
lower l e v e l  during 1831 and 1832. I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  propor t ion  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
of occupat iona l  groups a l s o  decreases ,  except  during t h e  immediate post-  
r evo lu t iona ry  pe r iod ,  when t h e  p r o t e s t s  of wine-growers and c e r t a i n  urban 
working-class groups appa ren t ly  swe l l s  t h e  r a t e .  Growing over  t ime,  however, 
a r e  t h e  r a t e s  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  -- p o l i c e ,  army, n a t i o n a l  
guard, e t c  -- and " ideo log ica l  groups." The l a t t e r  a r e  formations which, i n  
our judgment, were r e c r u i t e d  and defined i n  terms of a l l e g i a n c e  t o  some s p e c i f i c  
p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  o r  grouping. The i n c r e a s e  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by t h e s e  two 
groups sugges t s  t h a t ,  wi th  t h e  r evo lu t ion ,  t h e  bus ines s  of a c t i n g  out  v i o l e n t  
. . . . 
c o n f l i c t s  became - v e r y  much a  ma t t e r  f o r  s p e c i a l i s t s  .-- t h e  agepts  ' o f .  t h e  
government, on t h e  one hand, and a c t i v i s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of va r ious  p o l i t i c a l  
. .  : . . . . . . . . a  
t endencies ,  on t h e  o t h e r .  
. . 
To some e x t e n t ,  c e r t a i n  of t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  m a y  stem from t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
of our  knowledge of t h i s  per iod .  The r e a d e r s  and coders  may, i n  some cases ,  have 
i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  presence  of formations i n  a  more i d e o l o g i c a l  l i g h t  simply by 
, . 
v i r t u e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r evo lu t ion  had occurred.  Never the less ,  t h e  broad 
o u t l i n e s  of changing p a r t i c i p a t i o n  which we have der ived  from Table 2 a r e  
probably accu ra t e .  The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s ,  f o r  example, ro se  
as t h e  new government s t r o v e  t o  f i x  i t s  c o n t r o l  over t h e  p o l i t y .  The 
- .  
f requencies  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by r ep res s ive  formations f o r  1830-1832 were a s  
fol lows : 
Period 
Percent  of Disturbances i n  which 
Repressive Forces were Present  
July-Aug. 1830 
1830-32 7 0  
Since r e p r e s s i v e  formations -- t roops ,  p o l i c e ,  Nat ional  Guards and o t h e r  
armed f o r c e s  employed by governments -- a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  easy t o  i d e n t i f y  i n  
our r eco rds ,  t h e r e  seems l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  a  major change i n  t h e  cha rac te r  of 
v i o l e n t  encounters  occurred a s  t h e  r evo lu t ion  moved on. As t h e  su rv ivor s  of 
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  sought t o  conso l ida t e  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  over t h e  
government, they  inc reas ing ly  used organized f o r c e  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  enemies. 
Although they have r a r e l y  been documented as sys t ema t i ca l ly  as they  
a r e  he re ,  t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  and t h e  r i s e  of r ep res s ive  
formations a f t e r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power a r e  w e l l  known t o  h i s t o r i a n s  of 
r evo lu t ion .  The promulgators of n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  schemes f o r  r evo lu t ion  
ought t o  cons ider  those  two phenomena c a r e f u l l y ,  f o r  they i d e n t i f y  some 
s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  schemes a v a i l a b l e  t o  u s  s o  f a r .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
s t rong  v a r i a t i o n  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from group t o  group and time t o  time 
renders  implaus ib le  (or a t  l e a s t  inadequate) those  t h e o r i e s  which t r a c e  
r evo lu t ion  back t o  a  genera l ized  s t a t e  of t ens ion  o r  f r u s t r a t i o n .  We have 
not  undertaken t h e  demonstration here ,  but  i t  does no t  appear t h a t  i n  any 
3 
r ea sonab le  s ense  of t h e  words t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  were drawn from t h e  t e n s e s t  o r  
most f r u s t r a t e d  segments of t h e  popula t ion ,  o r  t h a t  t h e  change i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
of d i s tu rbances  corresponded t o  a  s h i f t  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t ens ion  o r  
f r u s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  popula t ion  a t  l a r g e .  Changes i n  t h e  power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  of 
p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t i v e  groups a t  t h e  l o c a l  and n a t i o n a l  l e v e l s  l a y  behind t h e  
v a r i a t i o n s  w e  have de t ec t ed .  
Second, t h e  r i s i n g  prominence of r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  i n . t h e s e  v i o l e n t  
c o n f l i c t s  bespeaks t h e  heavy involvement of governments i n  t h e  s t r u g g l e s  behind 
them. It i s  t h e r e f o r e  improper t o  a t t r i b u t e  t h e  succes s ive  phases of a  
r e v o l u t i o n  t o  changes i n  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  of t h e  popula t ion  a t  l a r g e  o r  even t o  
changes i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of some s i n g l e  group of " rebe ls . "  An adequate  theory  
has  t o  d e a l  w i t h  r e l a t i o n s  among contenders  and governments. 
.. T h i r d , b o t h  t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  and t h e . r i s e  of r e p r e s s i o n  grow from two 
l a r g e  processes .which  a r e  c e n t r a l  t o  r e v o l u t i o n ,  b u t  have l i t t l e  p l ace  i n  
n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  t h e o r i e s  of r evo lu t ion :  1)- t h e  s t r u g g l e  of t hose  who have 
s e i z e d  power t o  reimpose c o n t r o l  over  t h e  rest of t h e  popula t ion ,  which o f t e n  
p r0duces . a  wider  and f i e r c e r  c o n f l i c t  than  t h e  i n i t i a l  t r a n s f e r  of power; 2) 
t h e  breaking  up of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n ,  and t h e  e f f o r t  of some members 
of t h a t  c o a l i t i o n  t o  exclude o t h e r s  from power. These a r e  t h e  processes  which 
tend t o  f a r  h igher  l e v e l s  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  i f  t e r  t h e -  i n i t i a l '  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  t r a n s f e r  of power than  be fo re  i t .  Among n a t u r a l - h i s t o r y  
t h e o r i s t s , . ' C r a n e  B r i n t o n . ( a n  e x p e r t . h $ s t o r i a n  of t h e  French Revolut ion)  and 
. . 
P i t i r i m  Sorokin (an a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t - i n  t h e  Russion Revolut ion)  & r e . w e l l  
aware .of t h e s e  processes ;  i n  gene ra l  . terms, however, both of them a t t r i b u t e d  
t h e s e  processes  t o  t h e  con f ron ta t ion  between.a  tendency of t h e  most r u t h l e s s ,  
extreme r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  t o  succeed t h e i r  moderate b r e t h r e n ,  and t h e  i n t o l e r -  
a b i l i t y  of extremism t o  o r d i n a r y  people.  Nei ther  of t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  exp la ins  
much of 1830 ' s  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y .  
Nor i s  1830 a  s p e c i a l  ca se ,  except  i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  a l l  r e v o l u t i o n s  
a r e  s p e c i a l  cases .  The p a r a l l e l  d a t a  we have assembled f o r  t h e  French r e v o l u t i o n  
of 1848 ( see  T i l l y  1969c, 1970a) f a l l  i n t o  s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n s :  widespread 
r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  r e impos i t i on  of c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l ,  v i o l e n t  pos t - revolu t ionary  
s t r u g g l e s  among t h e  members of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s t r u g g l e s  among t h e  members of 
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n ,  important  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  geographic p a t t e r n  of 
v io l ence  corresponding t o  t h e  o s c i l l a t i n g  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power, f a r  h ighe r  l e v e l s  
of involvement a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  t r a n s f e r  of power, and s o  on. We do no t  have 
the  same s o r t  of sys t ema t i c  d a t a  f o r  t h e  g r e a t  r e v o l u t i o n  which began i n  1789; 
we recognize,  moreover, t h a t  t h e  events  of t h a t  r e v o l u t i o n  had a  f a r  wider 
impact than  d id  those  of 1830 and 1848. Within t h e  l i m i t s  of t h e  gene ra l i za -  
t i o n s  we have o f f e r e d ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  1789 r e v o l u t i o n  a l s o  appears  t o  
exemplify t h e  p a t t e r n .  That should ha rd ly  be s u r p r i s i n g ,  s i n c e  i t  was our  
r e f l e c t i o n  on 1789 and i t s  a f t e rma th  which f i r s t  l e d  u s  toward r e j e c t i n g  
n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  models and formula t ing  our  a l t e r n a t i v e  model. 
There a r e ,  o r  course ,  some d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  our  argument and i n  t h e  
evidence we have o f f e r e d  f o r  i t .  We have no t  provided r e l i a b l e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  . 
i d e n t i f y i n g  contenders  f o r  power o r  indexing t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  independent ly 
of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s t r u g g l e s  we propose t o  e x p l a i n ;  i n s t e a d ,  we have r e l i e d  
on s c h o l a r l y  consensus concerning t h e  main b l o c s  involved i n  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  of 
1830. Such a  consensus o f t e n  does not  e x i s t .  Even where i t  does,  i t  can 
hard ly  form a  r e l i a b l e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  s o r t  of comparable measurement over many 
c a s e s  which t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of our  argument would r e q u i r e .  
Again, our  scheme. y i e l d s  only  r a t h e r  weak in fe rences  concerning t h e  
k inds  of c o u n t r i e s  and/or  per iods  i n  which r e v o l u t i o n  i s  l i k e l y .  It does l i t t l e  . . , . 
more , than  r e d i r e c t  t h e  s e a r c h  away from gene ra l  tempos of s t r u c t u r a l  change o r  
broad l e v e l s  of t e n s i o n  toward t h e  formation of p o l i t i c a l  c o a l i t i o n s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  
making c e r t a i n  k inds  of c la ims .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  evidence presented  i n  t h i s  paper r a i s e s  doubts  about 
convent iona l  n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  ana lyses ,  bu t  i t  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r u l e  out  a  
number of a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of r evo lu t iona ry  processes  -- inc luding  
t h e  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  f rus t r a t ion -aggres s ion  formula t ions  which have been 
appear ing  i n , r e c e n t  yea r s .  We a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n -  
aggress ion  road , too ,  t u r n s  i n t o  a  b l i n d  a l l e y ,  i f  n o t  t h e  same one t o  which 
n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  l e a d s .  But t h e r e  w e  may be proved wrong. However t h e  search  
among t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  avenues now open t o  t h e  s tuden t  of r e v o l u t i o n  f i n a l l y  
t u r n s  o u t ,  i t ' w i l l  s u r e l y  t a k e  us  t o  a  much more e x p l i c i t  theory  of t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  i t s e l f  t han  modern s o c i o l o g i s t s  and psycho log i s t s  of 
r e v o l u t i o n  have been w i l l i n g  t o  employ. 
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